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We live in an era of populism, characterized by political polarization,
inciting speech on social media, and an escalation in hate crimes. The
regulatory framework for direct incitement to imminent lawless action
established fifty years ago in Brandenburg is showing signs of severe strain.
One of the central frailties of Brandenburg’s three-part test is the lack of
guidance on how courts should evaluate the probability that an inciting
speech act will cause an imminent offense. In the absence of clear direction
on analyzing risk, judges often rely on outdated heuristics and misleading
metaphors. This article is the first to draw on behavioral research to
construct a systematic evidence-based framework for assessing the likelihood
that inciting speech will result in imminent lawless action. This matrix is then
applied to the fact pattern in Sines v. Kessler, a civil suit arising from the
events in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017.
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“[W]hen a speaker incites a crowd to violence, his incitement
does not receive constitutional protection.”
–Bible Believers v. Wayne County, Michigan
INTRODUCTION
We live in an era of populist politics that is characterized by intense
emotional attributions of blame to elites,1 and an increase in political
communication that emphasizes threat, anger, and fear.2 While populism is
1

See Nadia Urbinati, Political Theory of Populism, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 111, 119 (2019)
(discussing the role of anti-elite populism in recent political elections).
2
See Michael Hameleers, Linda Bos & Claes H. de Vreese, “They Did It”: The Effects of
Emotionalized Blame Attribution in Populist Communication, 44 COMM. RES. 870, 871-72
(2017) (analyzing how anger, fear, and emotions as used in populist communication affect
different groups of people).
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time-honored, what is new about the current wave of populism is the degree
to which polarizing and caustic messages are amplified daily on social media
platforms that moderate the content of online speech under a First
Amendment framework.3 Vigorous political communication, even that which
is offensive and reprehensible to some, is protected by the First Amendment
and much political speech can be met with a variety of non-censorial
measures such as counterspeech.4
However, a segment of political speech may constitute incitement to
imminent physical attacks on political opponents or particular social groups.5
Since “[t]he First Amendment does not protect violence,”6 incitement is not
constitutionally protected,7 and implies a framework of regulation. The thesis
advanced here is that our current legal system is ill-equipped to deal with
inciting speech because it does not possess a systematic framework to
evaluate which speech causes the greatest risk of imminent violence.
One corollary of current populist politics in the United States since
2016 has been an increase in bias-motivated crimes against persons or
property. The 2016 presidential election occurred against the backdrop of one
of the largest recorded increases in hate crimes8 in U.S. history, second only
3

See generally Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1599 (2018) (explaining how social media
companies’ content moderation policies are shaped by the First Amendment).
4
See NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE SPEECH, NOT
CENSORSHIP 158 (2018) (discussing the importance of counterspeech as a response to hate speech).
5
See Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion? The Brandenburg Test and Speech that Encourages or
Facilitates Criminal Acts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 14 (2002) (explaining the imprecision
of the Brandenburg test, which is intended to articulate the limits of freedom of speech);
Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1145,
1145-49 (2010) (distinguishing offensive speech from incitement); Leslie Kendrick, Note, A
Test for Criminally Instructional Speech, 91 VA. L. REV. 1973, 1987-88 (2005) (discussing
the role of imminence in differentiating between criminal instructive speech, incitement, and
political advocacy). But see Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1095, 1103-06 (2005) (analyzing speech that facilitates the actual commission of crimes).
See generally Steven Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm and Other First Amendments, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 971 (2010) (examining the applicability of the Brandenburg paradigm to
nonpolitical speech).
6
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982).
7
“Speech that falls within th[e] category of incitement is not entitled to First Amendment
protection.” James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002) (considering
negligence claims against producers of violent video games and movies). An inciter is a
person who “counsels, commands or advises the commission of a crime,” according to
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 612 (2d ed. 1962).
8
The Hate Crime Statistics Act, 34 U.S.C. § 41305 (2018) defines hate crimes as “crimes
that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, gender or gender identity, religion,
disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.” The Bureau of Statistics’ National Crime
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to the upsurge after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.9 In 2016, the
nation’s law enforcement agencies10 reported 6121 single-bias incidents of
hate crimes involving 7509 victims, an increase of 5% in the number of
victims, even as overall crime decreased.11 In 2017, the trajectory of hate
crimes continued to climb steeply, and agencies reported 7106 single-bias
incidents, an increase of 17% on the year before.12 Of note in 2017 was the
31% rise in hate crimes committed on the basis of religious animus, primarily
against Jews and Muslims.13
Social media is often identified as a contributing factor for much that
ails modern society, including political polarization, but the mere fact that so
much political discourse occurs online has allowed researchers to analyze
more precisely than before the relationship between online speech and offline
hate crimes. Their findings have been sobering.14 For instance, Müller and
Schwarz identify a statistically significant correlation between antiVictimization Survey (NCVS) classifies a crime as a hate crime when the victim reports “at
least one of three types of evidence that the act was motivated by hate: (1) the offender used
hate language, (2) the offender left behind hate symbols, or (3) police investigators confirmed
that the incident was hate crime.” Hate Crime, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=37 [https://perma.cc/P833-J35U] (last
visited Jan. 28, 2019).
9
See Griffin Edwards & Stephen Rushin, The Effect of President Trump's Election on Hate
Crimes 6-7 (Jan. 18, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3102652
[https://perma.cc/WW6G-YL6K] (analyzing the effects of political speech during the U.S.
presidential elections).
10
Hate crimes are underreported by law enforcement agencies, and economists find evidence
for as many as 50,000 hate crimes a year in the United States. See Dhammika Dharmapala
& Richard H. McAdams, Words That Kill? An Economic Model of the Influence of Speech
on Behavior (with Particular Reference to Hate Speech), 34 J. LEGAL STUDS. 93, 94 n.3
(2005) (noting the difference between statistics published by the FBI and the Southern
Poverty Law Center, which estimates there are 50,000 hate crimes annually).
11
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERV. DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORT, HATE CRIMES STATISTICS, INCIDENTS & OFFENSES 1-2 (2016) [hereinafter 2016
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT].
12
Id.; CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERV. DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORT, HATE CRIMES STATISTICS, INCIDENTS & OFFENSES 1-2 (2017) [hereinafter
2017 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT].
13
In 2016, the FBI reported 1,538 religious bias incidents and in 2017, it reported 1,679. 2016
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, supra note 11; 2017 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, supra note 12.
14
See generally Karsten Müller & Carlo Schwarz, Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social Media
and Hate Crime (Feb. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 3082972
[https://perma.cc/RY4Z-ZLBS] (comparing the context of online hate speech in Germany and
the USA in 2016 & 2017); Jonathan Rothwell & Pablo Diego-Rosell, Explaining Nationalist
Political Views (Nov. 2, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2822059 [https://perma.cc/UZ57-HKAC] (examining support for nationalist
policies and racial resentment); Edwards & Rushin, supra note 9.

60

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[Jan. 2020

immigrant as well as anti-Muslim tweets and actual attacks on Muslims and
immigrants in 2016.15 The unprecedented conjuncture of populism and social
media has created new challenges for the regulation of incitement and
problematic internet content more broadly,16 given that the present legal
regime was designed in the 1960s, during the epoch of television, masscirculation newspaper, and leaflets passed out by hand on the urban street-corner.
We can identify these new challenges in incitement cases currently
winding their way through the U.S. courts.17 One illuminating case is Sines
v. Kessler, a civil suit filed in the aftermath of the events in Charlottesville,
Virginia, on August 11 and 12, 2017.18 The case relies on the defendants’
speech on Discord, an “invitation only” social media platform, in the days
before the violence in which a protestor was killed.19 Through posts on the
web platform, the defendants planned and coordinated the march of white
nationalists and white supremacists in Charlottesville, provided videos on
fighting techniques, and urged marchers to bring weapons such as
semiautomatic rifles, handguns and knives.20 Most significantly, the
defendants encouraged unlawful acts of violence, posting explicit calls for

15

Karsten Müller & Carlo Schwarz, From Hashtag to Hate Crime: Twitter and Anti-Minority
Sentiment 25-28 (Nov. 2, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3149103 [https://perma.cc/TDY2-86F4].
16
See, e.g., Nina I. Brown & Jonathan Peters, Say This, Not That: Government Regulation
and Control of Social Media, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 521, 527 (2018) (arguing that there is
little the federal government can do regarding content posted on social media); Danielle
Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans §
230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 454 (2017) (noting that “efforts to
hold social media companies responsible under the civil provisions of the federal materialsupport statute have consistently failed”); Gill Grassie, The Campaign Against Hate Crime
Online—Can Lessons Be Learned from the IP Takedown Experience to Date?, 21 J.
INTERNET L. 3, 3 (2017) (discussing government efforts to regulate social media companies
with respect to racist or defamatory content); James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of
Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42, 55-76 (2015) (providing a taxonomy of moderation in
online communities); Klonick, supra note 3, at 1635 (examining how content is moderated
ex ante vs. ex post); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J.
1353, 1357 (2018) (considering different policies on content moderation); Alexander
Tsesis, Social Media Accountability for Terrorist Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 605,
628 (2017) (discussing how Congress should look to international legislative models when
drafting material-support statutes).
17
See, e.g., Sines v. Kessler, 324 F. Supp. 3d 765 (W.D. Va. 2018) (alleging white
supremacists conspired to commit racial violence and asking whether the defendants’
incitement laden social media posts violated Virginia’s hate crimes statute); Gersh v. Anglin,
353 F. Supp. 3d 958 (D. Mont. 2018) (seeking punitive damages for the defendant’s inciting
and threatening posts against a Jewish woman on the Daily Stormer website).
18
Sines, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 765.
19
Id. at 776, 779.
20
Id. at 776, 804-05.
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violence against protestors and making approving remarks about running
over protestors with a vehicle, which in fact occurred.21
On the basis of the march organizers’ social media posts, the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Virginia has confirmed the injuries
suffered by the protestors were “reasonably foreseeable”22 in advance. This
raises the question, could they have been prevented if there had been an
adequate risk assessment prior to the march? Answering requires that we
delve more deeply into Brandenburg, the constitutional precedent on
incitement.23 In Brandenburg, a 1969 case concerning a Ku Klux Klan leader
from Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court established the precedent that speech
could not be suppressed unless it was “directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”24
Brandenburg’s three-part test abjures the suppression of mere advocacy of an
offense, and requires that the speaker (1) intended for a crime to be committed
and advocated an offense that is both (2) imminent and (3) likely to occur.25
While subsequent jurisprudence has gone some way to spelling out
the meaning of the “advocacy” and “imminence” elements, courts have
provided very little direction regarding how likely a crime must be, and what
criteria should be utilized in risk analysis. Incitement law therefore demands
that courts assess the risks accompanying hazardous public utterances but
has, thus far, not furnished the necessary tools to assess those risks.
Brandenburg’s lack of precision on the imminence and likelihood prongs
hinders its responsiveness to a resurgence of discriminatory animus in
political discourse. We are in a similar moment to the mid-2000s, when some
legal scholars claimed that the “War on Terror” had stretched Brandenburg
to its breaking point in cases involving post-9/11 terrorist propagandists.26
This Article is the first to draw on recent behavioral research on
persuasion, political communication, and dehumanizing speech to create a
rigorous and empirically-tested framework to guide legal actors as they assess
the probability that speech will culminate in imminent lawless action. Given
the uncertainty surrounding the imminence and likelihood elements of
incitement doctrine and the widespread occurrence of bias-motivated crimes,
21

Id. at 796.
Id. at 797.
23
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
24
Id. at 447.
25
Id.
26
See generally Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 240 (2005) (discussing the implications of terrorist speech on free
speech norms, and the strength of Brandenburg as a matter of precedent); Thomas Healy,
Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655 (2009) (examining the
continuing strength of Brandenburg in an age of political jihadism).
22
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it is a propitious time to turn to behavioral research for guidance on the types
of speech and contexts that are most likely to end in violent confrontations.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on
incitement in the twentieth century and how the “bad tendency” and “clear
and present danger” tests were excessively restrictive of political speech, and
neither could operationalize elements of imminence and the context of
utterances. Part II considers Brandenburg’s test for incitement and parses the
three elements, observing that direct advocacy has received the lion’s share
of the attention of courts, while imminence and probability have received
short shrift. Part III develops an original critique of current incitement
jurisprudence, observing how judges are prone to rely on personal hunches,
heuristics, and common metaphors to describe the likely causal effects of
speech. Part IV offers a solution to the current challenge of uninformed risk
assessment of speech by distilling the settled social science research on
inciting speech to identify ten primary factors, which, if present, provide for
joint sufficiency and indicate an elevated risk for imminent lawless action.
There are compelling reasons to revisit incitement law at our current
political juncture. Along with conspiracy and attempt, incitement is one of
the few offenses in criminal law that is an inchoate crime. Where the
probability is high that crimes will ensue, the speech advocating a crime is
already a punishable act, and law enforcement agencies need not wait for a
deleterious chain of events to unfold before they act.27 Incitement is a crime
of prevention and deterrence, but incitement law requires reform to better
fulfill its purpose of protecting citizens, and especially some of our most
vulnerable citizens, from imminent harm and injury.
I. “EVERY IDEA IS AN INCITEMENT”: REPRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE
PRE-BRANDENBURG
A. The Context of Speech
Since the history of incitement law in the early-mid twentieth
century is well-rehearsed, this Section focuses particularly on one strand
of that narrative; the unsuccessful effort to shift the constitutional emphasis
from the content of speech to the context of inciting speech, and in
particular to the elements of imminence and probability.
27

As described in United States v. White,
In the case of a criminal solicitation, the speech—asking another to commit
a crime—is the punishable act. Solicitation is an inchoate crime; the crime
is complete once the words are spoken with the requisite intent, and no
further actions from either the solicitor or the solicitee are necessary.
610 F.3d 956, 960 (7th Cir. 2010).
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In the midst of Civil Rights marches, anti-Vietnam war protests and
widespread social upheaval, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that political
advocacy could no longer be banned on the basis of “mere advocacy” alone.28
Courts are required to assess the probability that a crime is imminent, an activity
that implies an assessment of context.29 Risk analysis is therefore at the heart of
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence, but it took fifty years for this
idea, originally advanced by Justice Holmes in Schenck, to be accepted.30 Even
after it was formally endorsed, courts have proved neither adept nor eager to
conduct a risk analysis of inciting speech, an inherently difficult and contentious
exercise that implies provisional predictions about future behavior. Importantly,
courts have not been willing to set out the risk analysis criteria they use to
determine whether the crime being advocated is imminent or likely.
For most of our country’s history, the U.S. federal government and state
governments31 prohibited speech considered a threat to government authority or
public order, including speech that simply criticized individual office holders.32
The legal doctrines of criminal libel, blasphemy and out-of-chamber contempt of
the courts and legislatures were all inherited from the monarchical system of
Great Britain, and epitomized what Phillip Blumberg accurately terms the
“repressive jurisprudence” of the early American Republic.33
Severe restrictions on political speech were unwound between the mid1930s and the early 1950s as the U.S. Supreme Court swept away blasphemy,34
28

Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449.
Id. at 447.
30
In 1969, Brandenburg upheld the principle of risk analysis, understood as the evaluation
of the likelihood that advocacy of a crime will result in imminent lawless action. Id. In his
opinion fifty years earlier in Schenck, Holmes opined that,
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The call to review the circumstances as
well as the proximity and degree of speech represents an instruction to courts to engage in
risk analysis, and People v. Rubin, 96 Cal. App. 3d 968, 979 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), understood
“degree” as the risk-assessing “likelihood of producing such action.”
31
See, e.g., PHILLIP BLUMBERG, REPRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE LEGACY OF ENGLISH LAW 337 (2010)
(describing the statutes in Southern states in the early-mid 1800s suppressing abolitionist
speech, as well as a House of Representatives rule with the same effect).
32
Id. at 3-6 (describing the early years of the American republic and the consequences of the
1798 Sedition Act). See generally John F. Wirenius, The Road to Brandenburg: A Look at
the Evolving Understanding of the First Amendment, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (1994) (reciting
the history of First Amendment jurisprudence up into the twentieth century).
33
BLUMBERG, supra note 31, at 1.
34
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952).
29
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contempt of court for out-of-court speech,35 and criminal and civil libel involving
public persons.36 Incitement was one of the last elements of the regime of
repressive First Amendment jurisprudence inherited from English common law to
be liberalized. Each loosening of the restrictions on political speech incrementally
elevated the status of context, including the circumstances of speech and the risk
that it would imminently result in a crime.
B. Bad Tendencies
Until the end of the First World War, the mere tendency of speech
to encourage unlawful acts was sufficient basis to warrant its suppression,
no matter how remote the risk that the offense advocated would actually
occur.37 For example, the indictment in Pierce v. United States asked not
whether the low-circulation pamphlet could undercut a national program
of war conscription, but simply whether “the statements contained in the
pamphlet were not such as would naturally produce the forbidden
consequences.”38
In 1919, antiwar protestors were jailed under the “bad tendency”
standard in Debs v. United States and Frohwerk v. United States, with Debs
stating that the jury “could not find the defendant guilty for advocacy of any
of his opinions unless the words used had as their natural tendency and
reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service . . . .”39 Even a
tendency to produce an outcome that was not in itself an offense could be
sufficient to warrant criminal censure.40
35

Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42 (1941); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941).
See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (applying a new
actual malice standard to a civil libel case involving Martin Luther King, Jr.); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (analyzing the applicability of a criminal libel statute in the
context of allegedly disparaging remarks made by a prosecutor about local judges).
37
See generally KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 221-22
(1989) (laying out the bad tendency doctrine); Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg
v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply in Media Violence Cases? 27 N. KY. L. REV. 1 (2000)
(applying the Brandenberg defense to a series of media violence hypotheticals); Wirenius,
supra note 32, at 17 n.103 (summarizing early twentieth-century developments in the
caselaw); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 901 (1949) (reviewing
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)).
38
Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1920).
39
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919); see also Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204, 209 (1919) (observing that “it is impossible to say that it might not have been found
that the circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath would be enough to
kindle a flame”).
40
Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 275 (1915). Fox upheld a Washington statute preventing
the printing and circulation of written matter “which shall tend to encourage or advocate
disrespect for law or for any court or courts of justice,” even though “disrespect for the law”
was not a crime at the time. Id.
36
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The “bad tendency” standard was formally repudiated in First
Amendment jurisprudence in 1919,41 but its ghost still haunts modern municipal
and state ordinances.42 Here, it is worth observing that First Amendment
jurisprudence remains perpetually untidy, even as standards are gradually
liberalized.43 Standards emphatically renounced in one constitutional moment
can resurface decades later at the municipal and state level.
With the entry of the United States into the First World War and the
passage of the Espionage Act of 1917,44 a more flexible standard was needed to
protect political dissent, while acknowledging that the government might
legitimately restrict speech that undermined the war effort. Any dissenting
speech could conceivably stir up a tendency to law-breaking, and what was
additionally required was an assessment of risk that weighed the gravity and
proximity of the crime being urged.
C. Repressing Political Dissent: Clear and Present Danger
Schenck v. United States and Abrams v. United States, both decided in
1919, announced a new test for criminal advocacy and are widely considered the
fons et origo of modern jurisprudence on incitement and the First Amendment.45
In Schenck, the defendants were convicted of violations of the Espionage Act for
printing and circulating an antiwar leaflet to men who had been called up for
military service.46 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes replaced the overly capacious
“bad tendency” standard with the ostensibly more stringent “clear and present
danger test,” 47 which he articulated as:

41

See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“[T]he mere tendency
of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it.”).
42
See Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 237 (6th Cir. 2015) (describing
criminal accountability under state law and local ordinances “for conduct which has the
tendency to incite riotous behavior or otherwise disturb the peace”).
43
Gey, supra note 5, at 971 (discussing the “fracturing” of First Amendment law).
44
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 533-34 (1951) (providing a review of Espionage
Act cases).
45
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919); see, e.g., DANIEL FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 67-68 (4th ed. 2014) (asserting
that the Schenck and Abrams decisions in 1919 represented “one of the great turning points
in the development of First Amendment Doctrine”); Healy, supra note 26, at 711 (observing
how Brandenburg’s application of strict scrutiny of advocacy has its origins in Schenck);
Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech, supra note 5, at 1156 (describing how Schenck “established
the groundwork for contemporary doctrine”).
46
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48-49.
47
See id. at 52; see also Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (using the expression “clear and
imminent danger”).
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The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree.48
Despite the fact that Holmes took great pains in Schenck to add the qualifiers
of “proximity” and “degree,” which have been parsed by courts as tests of
imminence and likelihood,49 subsequent First Amendment cases emphasized
advocacy and content, rather than context and immediate circumstances.
There was no reference to gravity, proximity, or likelihood in Frohwerk, a
fourth Espionage Act case from 1919 which instead harked back to the “bad
tendency” standard.50
Any consideration of “proximity” (imminence) or “degree”
(likelihood) was also spurned in Gitlow (1925).51 In the place of a careful risk
analysis, Gitlow conjured up metaphors of fire and conflagration:
And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial,
because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately
foreseen. The State cannot reasonably be required to measure
the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a
jeweler's scale. A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire
that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and
destructive conflagration.52
The Supreme Court Justices in Gitlow stated their disdain for predictive
forecasting: “the question whether any specific utterance coming within the
prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil,
is not open to consideration.”53 The modern reticence to engage in risk
analysis, then, has identifiable historical antecedents.
In rejecting predictive forecasting, incitement law slipped backwards
into “bad tendency” territory once again in which all seditious advocacy was
treated as an existential threat to stability and order. Justice Holmes, joined
by Justice Brandeis, dissented from the majority’s (mis)interpretation of the
48

Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
“Proximity” could be straightforwardly read as “imminence” if we consider Holmes’s
dissenting comment in Abrams indicating that the public expression of opinions remains
protected speech unless the opinions “so imminently threaten immediate interference with
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the
country.” Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. Subsequent courts found that “degree” denoted the
“likelihood of producing such action.” See People v. Rubin, 96 Cal. App. 3d 968, 979 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1979).
50
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919).
51
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 670.
49
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“clear and present danger” standard that Holmes had created six years
previously, remarking that there was no real danger that the “Left Wing
Manifesto” published by the defendant would culminate in the overthrow of
the government.54 Holmes and Brandeis memorably protested the overly
inclusive application of incitement law to a low-circulation and insignificant
socialist pamphlet, on the grounds that under this standard, “[e]very idea is
an incitement.”55
After the Second World War, Red Scare legislation such as the Smith
Act strictly curtailed political speech.56 In 1951, Dennis v. United States, a
watershed case in which the Supreme Court reviewed the Smith Act, held that
the overall threat of communist revolution was a “sufficient evil”57 that
unshackled the courts from restraining criteria of probability or immediacy: “The
damage which such attempts create both physically and politically to a nation
makes it impossible to measure the validity in terms of the probability of success,
or the immediacy of a successful attempt.”58 By Dennis, the “clear and present
danger” standard had become so enfeebled that it provided little protection from
Red Scare mania,59 and permitted convictions for merely reading and discussing
books by Stalin, Marx and Engels, and Lenin.60
Dennis was riven with sharp disagreement, and Justice Douglas wrote
an angrily worded dissent61 which held that there is a “wide difference”62
between advocacy and incitement, and observed that communists in America are
“miserable merchants of unwanted ideas; their wares remain unsold.”63
Imminence64 and probability—in short, risk analysis—constituted Douglas’s
answer to the majority’s unwarranted suppression of a marginal political doctrine
that patently lacked the resources to mount an existential challenge. Probability
is at the heart of the question of whether advocacy of a crime constitutes
incitement; namely the probability that an incitement to lawbreaking sufficiently
enhances the chances that a violation will occur.65 But what is sufficient?
54

Id. at 655.
Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
56
Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
2385 (2018) (criminalizing activity which could be construed as supporting “overthrowing
or destroying the government of the United States” or any state governments).
57
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
58
Id.
59
See generally ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA
(1999) (discussing the Red Scare and the impact of McCarthyism).
60
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 582 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61
Id. at 579.
62
Id. at 586.
63
Id. at 589.
64
Id. at 585.
65
Id.
55
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D. Free Speech in the Early Civil Rights Era
By 1957, McCarthyism was a spent political force and Justice
Douglas’ plea for a more contextual approach to incitement began to gain
traction. In that year, Yates v. United States reversed the convictions of
communist party officials under the Smith Act and affirmed that speakers
could not be punished merely for advocating seditious political beliefs.66
Yates drew a sharp line between abstract advocacy that was protected
speech and incitement to illegal action that was unprotected.67
Noto v. United States, decided during the tumult of the Civil Rights
era, demanded narrower criteria for incitement, reversing the conviction of
a communist activist convicted under the Smith Act for advocating the
overthrow of the government.68 Noto raised the actus reus threshold of
incitement to include imminence. Advocacy of crimes, such as sabotage to
achieve a revolutionary moment, must represent “present advocacy,”69 not
just urge revolution in a remote future. Advocacy of rebellion was
insufficient, and there had to be some chance that the incitement would
achieve the undesirable result.70 Noto was the stepping stone to
Brandenburg and signified the turning point when requirements of
proximity and likelihood became part of the consensus opinion.
To summarize: before Brandenburg, government regulation of
speech was frequently oppressive and served to preserve state interests.
During two World Wars and one Cold War, legislators and judges
regulated dissent that opposed conscription for war or advocated
revolutionary socialism. That the Supreme Court lifted historic restrictions
on speech in the cauldron of the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war era was
not the result of a road-to-Damascus conversion of justices to the cause of
dissent, but because the state was secure enough to tolerate seditious
speech, given the limited ideological appeal and feeble organizational
capacity of American socialism.71

66

Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318-27 (1957), overruled by Burks v. United States,
437 U.S. 1 (1978).
67
Id. at 318.
68
Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
69
Id. at 298.
70
Id at 298-99.
71
“[I]t is impossible for me to say that the Communists in this country are so potent or so
strategically deployed that they must be suppressed for their speech.” Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 589 (1951). We might also recall Holmes’s dissent in Abrams when he
refers to the defendants as “poor and puny anonymities.” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 629 (1919).
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II. BRANDENBURG V. OHIO:
CONTEXTUALIZING SPEECH AND ASSESSING RISK
A. The Contours of Brandenburg
Brandenburg v. Ohio, decided in 1969, announced a new standard
that required courts to evaluate the risks of political speech and embraced
the contextual elements presaged in Schenck, combining direct advocacy
of a crime with an assessment that the offense will be committed
imminently. The Brandenburg test has been settled law for five decades.72
That said, Brandenburg is an odd decision. Barely four pages long,
it is terse and unsigned, having been issued per curiam. It defines
incitement with a novel three-part test that adds imminence and likelihood
to a prior advocacy standard but provides no guidance on the three
elements. It is contradictory in places, question-begging in others and
gives the overall impression of being undercooked. This resulted from the
fact that it was drafted by two authors, each with distinct objectives.
Justice Abe Fortas commenced the initial draft but then resigned from the
Court amidst an ethics scandal, and the judgement was revised and
completed by Justice Brennan.73
Scholars are frequently critical of Brandenburg, and Gey calls it
“murky and inelegant.”74 Their criticisms are comprehensible but perhaps
miss the point. Brandenburg only makes sense as a stealth precedent. Like
Justice Harlan in Noto, Justice Brennan rolled out a new test covertly, all
the while professing that the new schema was simply an extension of
Dennis and Yates.75 Brandenburg represents, in fact, a clear break with
First Amendment law up until that point.

72

See Gey, supra note 5, at 977 (declaring that the Brandenburg standard “is now one of the
most well-established aspects of modern constitutional doctrine”); Tsesis, Inflammatory
Speech, supra note 6, at 1159 (stating that Brandenburg represents “The Modern Test”). The
Brandenburg test has been augmented by the principle that the First Amendment does not
protect political speech or expressive conduct that materially supports foreign terrorist
organizations. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 4 (2010).
73
Gey, supra note 5, at 977; see also Bernard Schwartz, Justice Brennan and the
Brandenburg Decision—A Lawgiver in Action, 79 JUDICATURE 24, 27-28 (1995) (providing
a history and analysis of the Court’s decision in Brandenberg).
74
Gey, supra note 5, at 977.
75
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448, 453, 457 (1969) (per curiam) (citing Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)); see Schwartz, supra note 73 (documenting Brennan’s
authoring of Brandenburg).
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B. The Facts and the Test
Defendant Clarence Brandenburg was a Ku Klux Klan leader who
invited a television crew to a farm outside Cincinnati where he addressed a
small group of Klan members in 1964,76 the year in which the Civil Rights
Act was passed.77 After the footage aired on Cincinnati and national
television stations, he was prosecuted under Ohio’s antilabor syndicalism
statute which made it illegal to advocate an offense or violence.78
Ohio prosecutors relied on two films taken by the television crew as
evidence.79 In the first, twelve hooded figures carrying firearms and
ammunition stood by a burning cross.80 The second film featured six armed
figures wearing Klan regalia.81 According to the lower court, the defendant’s
most inciting utterance occurred in the first film, “We’re not a revengent [sic]
organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court,
continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might
have to be some revengeance [sic] taken.”82 Clarence Brandenburg added that
the Klan was planning a march six days later to Congress, and, after that, to
Florida and Mississippi.83 In the second film, he made a similar speech that
included extreme animus and threats against Jews and African Americans.84
Brandenburg’s conviction in a jury trial resulted in a fine of $1000
and a sentence of one to ten years in prison,85 and the Ohio Supreme Court
affirmed the trial verdict.86 The U.S. Supreme Court then reversed the
conviction on the grounds that the defendant’s statements represented
“mere abstract teaching of the moral propriety” of racism and possible
future action against the government and others.87 Brandenburg thus
proclaimed its new test:
the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or

76

Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-45.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
78
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-45.
79
Id. at 445.
80
Id. at 445-46.
81
Id. at 447.
82
Id. at 446.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 447.
85
Id. at 445.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 448-49 (citing Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
77
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producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.88
On this basis, and citing Noto, Brandenburg held that the Ohio syndicalism
statute violated the First Amendment because it failed to distinguish between
“mere advocacy” and “incitement to imminent lawless action.”89
Brandenburg’s innovation was to add two contextual conditions—
imminence and likelihood—to the long-established element of criminal
advocacy. Brandenburg, however, provides no guidance on any of the three
elements of the test. Advocacy was already a fundamental (if not the sole)
element of incitement law before Brandenburg, and therefore it had already
been the subject of extensive judicial interpretation as we just saw in the cases
just reviewed, including Schenck, Abrams, Gitlow, Dennis, and Noto.
Imminence was indeterminate at the time and has received only a modicum
of elucidation since Brandenburg. Likelihood has been barely defined at all.
Healy observes that such conceptual gaps “have been largely glossed over by
courts and scholars.”90
Furthermore, Brandenburg did not apply its own criteria of
imminence and likelihood to the fact pattern in the case. It never asked
whether the Ku Klux Klan posed a danger at the time of the cross-burning
event, or whether the risk of violence had been elevated sufficiently by
televising a Klan leader’s speech to a wide audience. Clarence Brandenburg’s
televised speech included a call to march on Washington, D.C. and the
statements, “[t]his is what we are going to do to the n-----rs,” and, “[b]ury the
n----rs,” which were uttered next to a burning cross surrounded by hooded
and armed Klansmen, at a time (1964) when violent clashes were a frequent
occurrence on the streets of the United States.91 There is reason to believe
that if the Court had applied the contextual approach it was advocating
exactingly, then Brandenburg’s utterances may not have qualified as
protected speech.
Our thesis here is that the lacunae in Brandenburg, particularly with
respect to imminence and likelihood, hinder its application to political speech
that incites violence,92 and effectively stymie any preventative function
88

Id. at 447.
Id. at 448-49. Later cases have interpreted the standard in Brandenburg as requiring
“violence or physical disorder in the nature of a riot.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228
(9th Cir. 2000) (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448, to define “imminent lawless action”).
90
Healy, supra note 26, at 660; see also Rohr, supra note 5, at 7, 14 (discussing the
peculiarities and ambiguities of the Brandenburg framework).
91
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446 n.1.
92
The Fourth Circuit has limited the application of Brandenburg to political speech. Rice v.
Paladin Enterps., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 262 (4th Cir. 1997). Not all courts, however, have
followed this interpretation.
89
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incitement law might have. The next Sections explore what subsequent courts
have understood by advocacy, imminence, and likelihood, with special
attention to the least developed of the three; likelihood, or probability. Since
1969, Brandenburg has only been cited thrice by the U.S. Supreme Court: in
Hess v. Indiana (1973), NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware (1982), and Texas v.
Johnson (1989). The Supreme Court has not applied the decision in nearly thirty
years, and therefore any comprehensive discussion of incitement doctrine must
incorporate rulings by lower courts.
C. The Elements of Incitement: Direct Advocacy
In the United States, it is axiomatic that robust political speech, including
that which is offensive, caustic, and even coercive is protected by the First
Amendment.93 As Justice Stevens wrote in Claiborne,
[s]trong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely
channeled in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate must be free to
stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals
for unity and action in a common cause. When such appeals do
not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected
speech.94
The key phrase here is “incite lawless action,” and according to the language in
Brandenburg, political speech is protected unless it constitutes “advocacy” that
is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.”95 There is a great
deal of guidance about what kind of speech constitutes “advocacy,” and it is
widely recognized that the advocacy prong is the most salient of the three prongs
of the Brandenburg test.96
As with most crimes, incitement contains a mens rea requirement in
which the speaker must intend to advocate a criminal offense.97 A mere tendency
for the speech to prompt lawless action is not sufficient to remove constitutional
protection.98 Constitutional scholars generally regard the reference to advocacy

93

See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) (protecting
coercive speech); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (protecting robust
criticism of, and non-true threats towards, the President); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (protecting caustic speech).
94
Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 928.
95
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
96
See Smolla, supra note 37, at 15 (stating that advocacy/intent is the most significant of the
three prongs of Brandenburg).
97
MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02, §5.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1962); see Kent Greenawalt, Speech
and Crime, 5 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 645, 652 (1980) (elaborating on the requirement that
the speaker have the purpose of inciting a crime).
98
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
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that is “directed to inciting or producing” as enacting an intent requirement,99
and Chemerinsky maintains that “Brandenburg contains an intent requirement:
the speech must be directed to causing the harm.”100 Subsequent decisions have
made this explicit. For instance, State v. Beasley opines, “[w]hen considering the
offense of inciting to riot, . . . the language used must clearly intend to incite a
breach of the peace.”101
What is repeated again and again in the post-Brandenburg era is that
criminal advocacy in the abstract is not enough in itself to trigger a sanction.102
Contextual evaluation has become more relevant in recent years, as courts are
forced to adapt First Amendment law to the fast-moving advertising, internet,
and social media environment.103
A recent case illustrates the principle that advocacy alone is insufficient.
In American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, the court found that bus advertisements that portrayed a man whose
head and face were mostly covered by a head scarf and a recited quote from a
Hamas television channel, “Killing Jews is Worship that draws us close to Allah”
and stated underneath the quote, “That’s His Jihad. What’s yours?” were
protected by the First Amendment.104 The plaintiffs argued that the
advertisements advocated violence, but the court countered that the target of the
purported advocacy was not clear, and that the ads were not advocating any
action.105 The constitutional protection afforded to abstract advocacy means that
speech that fails to advocate any action at all cannot constitute incitement, no
matter how repugnant or reprehensible the views advocated.106
99

Gey, supra note 5, at 1021; Healy, supra note 26, at 698; Smolla, supra note 37, at 10.
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008, 2017 (2002).
101
State v. Beasley, 317 So.2d 750, 753 (Fla. 1975); see also Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty.,
Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 245-46 (6th Cir. 2015) (discussing intention and advocacy).
102
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (stating that the determination of
whether an employee’s speech is a matter of public concern depends on the “content, form,
and context” of the statement); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927
(1982) (reiterating that “mere advocacy of force or violence does not remove speech from
the protection of the First Amendment”).
103
See generally Tsesis, Social Media Accountability for Terrorist Propaganda, supra note
16 (discussing the role of context in determining the liability of intermediaries for social
media posts that incite terrorism).
104
Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 70 F. Supp. 3d 572, 582-83
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated, 109 F.Supp.3d 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff'd, 815 F.3d 105 (2d Cir.
2016) (vacating the decision below because the transit authority changed its polices to
prohibit all political advertising).
105
Id. at 582.
106
See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam) (noting the requirement that
the inciter advocate lawless action that is imminent); see also Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty.,
Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 245 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that the advocacy of the Bible Believers
group did not call for any action at all).
100
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Next, it is settled First Amendment law that the suppression of speech
cannot be content—or viewpoint—based, and any such restrictions are subject to
strict scrutiny in which the government bears the burden of proof that the proposed
regulation is necessary. 107 The only allowable constraints on speech are “time,
manner[,] or place” restrictions that are content-neutral.108 The paradigmatic case
instantiating this principle is R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota. In R.A.V.,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reversed and remanded the conviction of a
defendant who had been convicted for burning a cross on the lawn of an African
American family under a city ordinance that prohibited bias-motivated disorderly
conduct.109 St. Paul’s statute was substantially overbroad110 and violated the First
Amendment by censoring speech on the basis of content (i.e., bias-motivated
content) because it only placed prohibitions on speech that discriminated on the
basis of “race, color, creed, religion[,] or gender.”111 While obscenity, defamation
and fighting words can be regulated because of their content, the St. Paul ordinance
went “beyond mere content, to actual viewpoint discrimination.”112
A 2003 cross-burning case that represents an exception to the anticontent
discrimination rule is Virginia v Black. This case invoked “true threat,” rather than
incitement.113 In Black, three individuals (including a leader of the Ku Klux Klan)
were convicted separately under a Virginia statute banning cross-burning and their
convictions were reversed by the Virginian Supreme Court, citing R.A.V. The
Supreme Court, however, noted that the Virginia statute was analytically
distinguishable from the statute at issue in R.A.V. since it was content and
viewpoint neutral, simply making it a felony “for any person . . . with the intent of
intimidating any person or group . . . to burn . . . a cross on the property of another,
a highway or other public place,”114 regardless of viewpoint on race, religion,
gender, political affiliation, or any other axis of identity.115
107

See Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 247 (reiterating the importance of content-neutral speech
restrictions); see also Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1184-85 (9th Cir.
2006) (discussing how public schools are excepted from the usual injunction on viewpoint
discrimination and may prohibit student speech that disrupts school activities or violates the
rights of other students).
108
Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 247.
109
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 379, 396 (1992).
110
Id. at 391.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-66 (2003). Black relies primarily on the
jurisprudence related to threats but cites Brandenburg twice: for guidance on incitement and
whether cross burning is protected expression. Id. at 359, 366.
114
Id. at 348.
115
The Court held as unconstitutional that section of the Virginia statute that claimed that cross
burning constitutes, in itself, prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate. Id. at 345. Virginia’s
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Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, observed that cross-burning
has been a symbol of the Ku Klux Klan’s reign of terror in the South since
1866,116 and concluded that a state may ban cross-burning carried out with
intent to intimidate, consistent with the First Amendment.117 Importantly, the
Court confirmed that the First Amendment does not extend to true threats.118
Intriguingly for our discussion, Black permits the suppression of true threats
against collective groups, be they families or racial or religious groups. It is
possible that under Black’s definition of group threat, Clarence Brandenburg’s
declarations of his violent intentions towards African Americans, uttered using
an ethnic slur and alongside armed Klansmen and in front of a burning cross,
may have constituted a true threat.119 The ruling in Black could constitute a
charter for how state legislatures may write statutes banning incitement and true
threats that call for violent action.
Of the three elements of the Brandenburg test, advocacy has received
the most interpretation and guidance in the subsequent constitutional
jurisprudence. The speaker must directly advocate lawless action and not
simply express a provocative or unpopular view that may result in public
disorder.120 This is not an objective test because the speaker must intend that
others commit an offense, and their intentionality need not be expressed via an
instruction for the specific offense committed but may be implicitly
understood.121 As established in R.A.V., restrictions on speech cannot be
content- or viewpoint-based.122
D. The Elements of Incitement: Imminence
Imminence is the second element of the Brandenburg test, and, combined
with the likelihood prong, it distinguishes modern incitement from the repressive
jurisprudence of the “bad tendency” and “clear and present danger” tests. Along
with conspiracy and attempt, incitement is an inchoate crime.123 The standard
statute read, “[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons,” id. at 348, on the grounds that this unnecessarily
suppresses ideas and abjures consideration of any contextual factors. Id. at 345.
116
Id. at 352-57.
117
Id. at 362.
118
See id. at 360 (explaining that a prohibition on true threats protects individuals from the
fear of violence and the disturbances that fear creates).
119
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 n.1 (1969) (per curiam).
120
Id. at 447-48.
121
Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 245, 246 n.11 (6th Cir. 2015).
122
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
123
JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS IN CRIMINAL LAW
772 (6th ed. 2012); Larry Alexander & Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes,
87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1139 (1997).
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justification for inchoate crimes is that they are crimes of prevention,124 designed
for circumstances in which the offense is impending, and there is not sufficient
time to expose “falsehoods and fallacies”125 in the marketplace of ideas,126 or to
allow deliberation on the part of the listener, or give police enough time to take
appropriate measures.127
By requiring imminence, Brandenburg built on Schenck’s language
of “proximity and degree,” but Brandenburg did not explain precisely how
imminent the lawless action must be to warrant suppression of the speech.
Proximity remained undefined until another per curiam Court decision, Hess
v. Indiana.128 Gregory Hess was convicted for disorderly conduct during an
anti-Vietnam war demonstration on the campus of Indiana University. After
police forced a group of about 100 student demonstrators blocking traffic to
move to the sidewalk, Hess said in a normal voice and to no one in particular,
"We’ll take the fucking street later [or again]."129 The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, stating that Hess’s words could not be considered
obscenity,130 fighting words, or insult since they were not directed at any
particular person.131
According to the Court, Hess’s utterance was ambivalent and did not
call for any immediate action.132 Lawless action was only encouraged “at
some indefinite future time,”133 which was insufficient to justify a conviction
for incitement, because, citing Brandenburg, the lawless action must be
imminent. Hess did not demarcate any clear temporal boundaries of
imminence, but analysts have inferred that “imminent” meant immediately or

124

For more context regarding inchoate crimes, see generally ANDREW ASHWORTH & LUCIA
ZEDNER, PREVENTATIVE JUSTICE (2014) and Michael T. Cahill, Defining Inchoate Crime:
An Incomplete Attempt, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 751 (2012).
125
As Justice Brandeis eloquently stated, “If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
126
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J. dissenting) (“[T]he best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”).
127
See generally Healy, supra note 26, at 680 (examining imminence and police intervention
in the Al-Timimi case).
128
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam); see Smolla, supra note 37, at 22-30
(analyzing imminence in Hess and the development of imminence after Brandenburg).
129
Hess, 414 U.S. at 107.
130
By 1973, the word “fuck” was no longer considered obscene. Id. at 107 (citing Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), in which the defendant wore a jacket bearing the antiwar
message, “Fuck the Draft”).
131
Id.at 107-08.
132
Id. at 108-09.
133
Id.
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within a few hours, not a day or several days or weeks later.134 Greenawalt
sees the “imminent” in Hess as “momentarily” or in the “very near future.”135
Imminence was further defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in
NAACP. v. Claiborne Hardware Co, a civil case brought by white store
owners against African American leaders who organized a boycott of whiteowned stores in Claiborne County, Mississippi in 1966 and 1967.136 One of
the defendants, NAACP field secretary Charles Evers, had threatened African
Americans in the community with physical harm if they patronized whiteowned stores, saying “If we catch any of you going in any of them racist
stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”137
Reversing the convictions, the Court made clear “that mere advocacy
of the use of force or violence does not remove speech from the protection
of the First Amendment” unless that violence is imminent.138 Acts of
violence and intimidation were prevalent after Evers’s 1966 speech,
including shots fired into a home, a brick thrown through a windshield and
beatings of boycott-breakers, but these happened some “weeks or months”
later, and therefore could not be considered proximate to the speech act.139
As in Hess, the Supreme Court refrained from specifying exactly how soon
after Evers’ speech any violence would have had to have occurred for the
defendant to be held liable.
The temporal duration of imminence was extended significantly in
1979 by the California Court of Appeal in People v. Rubin,140 in which the
defendant, the national director of the Jewish Defense League, offered a
reward for the murder or serious injury of any Nazi participant in a march
planned in Skokie, Illinois, some five weeks later. At a press conference,
Irving Rubin held up five hundred-dollar bills and said he would give them
to any person who “kills, maims, or seriously injures a member of the
American Nazi Party. . . . And if they bring us the ears, we’ll make it a
thousand dollars. The fact of the matter is, that we’re deadly serious. This is
not said in jest, we are deadly serious.”141
The California appeals court determined that five weeks was sufficiently
imminent to trigger the application of Brandenburg: “We think solicitation of
murder . . . even though five weeks away, can qualify as incitement to imminent
134

See Healy, supra note 26, at 715-17 (explaining that as time passes, predicting the
likelihood of a crime becomes more difficult as conditions and variables may change).
135
GREENAWALT, supra note 37, at 267.
136
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 889-91 (1982).
137
Id. at 902.
138
Id. at 927 (emphasis in original).
139
Id. at 928.
140
People v. Rubin, 96 Cal. App. 3d 968, 979 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
141
Id. at 982.
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lawless action.”142 The court refrained from any categorical statement that
imminence hinges on gravity, however. Instead, using metaphorical and
elliptical language, the court tentatively suggested that imminence is a relative
concept and suggested that it varied according to the “nature” (i.e., gravity) of
the crime being incited: “But time is a relative dimension and imminence a
relative term, and the imminence of an event is related to its nature. A total
eclipse of the sun next year is said to be imminent. An April shower thirty
minutes away is not.”143 Such lyrical and indirect speech is common in First
Amendment cases and is utterly unconstructive.
In the current digital era, imminence is coming under new scrutiny. In
United States v. Fullmer, the Third Circuit found that the act of scheduling a
specific time for an unlawful act committed online, even if that time is not
immediate, was relevant in determining imminence. In Fullmer, an animal rights
group’s website advocated electronic sit-ins, where many people access a
website at the same time, causing it to crash. The advocacy group’s website
provided a schedule for sit-ins and updates on ongoing sit-ins. Because the group
provided information about sit-ins at specified times, the court found that the
information about sit-ins was intended to incite an imminent unlawful act.144
E. The Elements of Incitement: Likelihood
In 1919, Justice Holmes’s formulation of the “clear and present danger”
test was accompanied by an insistence that courts should assess the probability
that a crime could ensue from dissenting speech. Debs demanded an assessment
of the “reasonably probable effect” of speech,145 and Justice Holmes dissented
in Abrams because he felt that the antiwar speech in question had little chance of
having a tangible effect on the war effort since it represented little more than “the
surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man.”146
Courts applying the “clear and present danger” test soon jettisoned the
element of probability, and the majorities in Gitlow and Dennis took great pains
to discount its relevance.147 Risk assessment reentered incitement doctrine via
the constitutional law of fighting words, and specifically Cantwell. This case
interpreted the “clear and present danger” test stringently by refusing to suppress
insults, profanities or verbal abuse, and banning only those words “likely to
provoke violence and disturbance of good order, even though no such eventuality
142

Id. at 979.
Id. at 978.
144
United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155 (3d Cir. 2009).
145
Debs v. United States., 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919).
146
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
147
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 527 (1951); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
669 (1925).
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be intended.”148 What is intriguing about Cantwell is that it elevates probability
over intentionality, an inversion of their conventional framing in First
Amendment law.
As noted, Brandenburg does not tell us how much a speech act must
elevate the risk of an offense to justify its banning, and neither do Hess and
Claiborne, subsequent cases that addressed the imminence prong. A combing of
lower court cases turns up rather meager findings. In United States v. White, a
2010 case of a white-supremacist website that solicited the murder of the
foreperson of the jury that had convicted a white nationalist leader, the Seventh
Circuit considered the defendant’s web posting in the context of the extremist
community of Neo-Nazis frequenting the website (Overthrow.com), where
enemies were frequently identified for assassination.149 White quotes the
defendant’s own admission that his online solicitation to murder had “so great a
potential for action.”150 Because the call reached a multitude of white supremacist
readers, the Seventh Circuit held that “someone could kill or harm Juror A.”151
Rubin promised to define the likelihood prong of Brandenburg by titling
a whole section of the decision, “Degree: Likelihood of Producing Action,” but
the section simply restates the obvious in an anecdotal manner, observing that
emotional appeals to political violence are given respectability when transmitted
by reputable news media and that words uttered with a serious intention are more
likely to produce violence than those delivered in jest.152 Rubin offers no
generalizable statement on probability, including the criteria on which to base any
risk analysis or how much the speech must elevate the chances of violence to lose
constitutional protection.
Thus far, there has been no systematic discussion of the class of speech
acts or the contextual factors most likely to incite imminent lawless action. The
caselaw is anecdotal and has thus far abjured any comprehensive or rigorous
statement of a generalizable principle of risk analysis. Courts are left to reach back
to cases with wildly different fact patterns, with the result that principles gleaned
from earlier trials are often misapplied.153
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Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940).
United States v. White, 610 F.3d 956, 957 (7th Cir. 2010).
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Id.
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Id. at 1016 (emphasis in original).
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People v. Rubin, 96 Cal. App. 3d 968, 979-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
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For instance, the appellants in Nwanguma v. Trump misapply Bible Believers in their brief
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by the speaker. See Opening Brief of Appellants Donald J. Trump and Donald J. Trump for
President, Inc. at 34-35, Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-6290).
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First Amendment scholars have offered guidance on the requisite
threshold of probability, and Smolla suggests a “more probable than not”
standard that violence will ensue from inciting speech,154 but he gives no
basis for his formulation, other than it seems like a promising place to start.
Healy discusses likelihood under an article subheading on imminence, and
suggests that the probability standard should be a “reasonable chance” that
the harm will result,155 drawing on Greenawalt who recommends “reasonable
likelihood,” an imprecise formulation that simply adds “reasonable” to
“likelihood” to render the standard appear more, well, reasonable.156 Healy
mulls over a hypothetical scenario that could elevate or depress the likelihood
of a crime occurring if, for instance, a speaker encourages a crowd to storm
the city hall in five hours, but draws few general principles.157
And that is all we have to go on with respect to the likely meaning of
Brandenburg’s “likely to incite or produce.”158 It is not an overstatement to
conclude that the likelihood prong of the Brandenburg three-part test is
woefully underdeveloped and largely anecdotal, to the extent that it hampers
the meaningful application of the element, and possibly interferes with the
application of incitement law tout court. According to Gey, the end result of
the Brandenburg test is “a system guaranteeing virtually absolute protection
of free speech within the realm of political advocacy.”159
The manifest lack of protection for the persons targeted by inciting
speech is related in part to the dearth of guidance on key elements of the
Brandenburg test, and incitement law could greatly benefit from more precise
and accurate guidance on the elements of imminence and probability. Thus
154

See Smolla, supra note 38, at 10 (“The ‘likelihood’ prong of Brandenburg appears to
mean simply that it is more probable than not that violence will ensue as a result of the
defendants’ action.”).
155
See Healy, supra note 26, at 715 n.358 (“Greenawalt has proposed a similar standard,
arguing that there must be a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that criminal advocacy will lead to
crime.”); see also id. at 721 (“As a middle position, therefore, we might conclude that the
government can prohibit advocacy of extraordinary harm if there is a ‘reasonable chance’
that the harm will result.”).
156
See GREENAWALT, supra note 37, at 267-68 (stating that the likelihood should be
“substantial” and vary according to the gravity of the crime).
157
In Healy’s own words,
As the time frame expands outward, however, the prediction becomes
increasingly difficult because of the many unknowable variables involved.
If a speaker urges a rowdy audience to storm city hall five hours later, it
may initially appear likely that they will do so. But many things could
happen between now and then to dissuade them.
Healy, supra note 26, at 716.
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Furthermore, to our knowledge there is no discussion at all of the phrase “or produce,”
either in the caselaw or in legal scholarship.
159
Gey, supra note 5, at 975.
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far, to our knowledge, there has been no comprehensive and contemporary
statement on the conditions that predict uptake of inciting speech by listeners.
III. CAUSATION, IMMINENCE, AND LIKELIHOOD
Why does it matter that the Brandenburg test only provides meager
guidance on its contextual elements? Stated plainly, until incitement doctrine
includes an unambiguous definition of probability and a systematic
framework for risk analysis, courts are still in the terrain of the “clear and
present danger” test, or worse, “bad tendency” doctrine. For the past one
hundred years, the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower courts have aspired to
go beyond the suppression of mere advocacy and to evaluate the potential
harms of speech in its context; hence the “proximity and degree” language of
the “clear and present danger” standard, and the imminence and likelihood
elements of the Brandenburg test.
In a democracy, a systematic framework of risk assessment is
required to evaluate political speech, but this project has progressed in fits
and starts and is still incomplete. As long as the nonadvocacy prongs remain
undefined, the legal regulation of political speech will remain unpredictable
and inconsistent, and this will undermine its legitimacy. Without a reliable
and defensible guide to predicting what categories of public speech acts in
what kinds of contexts are more likely to prompt violence, the courts cannot
fulfill the main rationale of incitement law, namely the prevention of
substantial evils that Congress and state legislatures have a right to prevent.
If the state cannot adequately protect its citizenry from one another and
prevent foreseeable harms, then it has failed in its most elementary duty.160
At this point, it is worth reviewing first principles. Like conspiracy
and attempt, incitement is an inchoate crime,161 where the verbal
160

In Karl Popper’s liberal democratic theory of the state, the state exists to protect citizens’
freedoms from the aggression of others. KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES
110-11 (5th ed. 1966). Consistent with Thomas Hobbes’ version of the social contract,
Popper conceives the origins of the state in its function as a crime prevention society based
upon a social contract with its citizens to provide for their security. See id. (“I am perfectly
ready to see my own freedom of action somewhat curtailed by the state, provided I can obtain
protection of that freedom which remains . . . . [T]he state should be considered as a society
for the prevention of crime i.e. aggression.”).
161
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines an inciter as:
[O]ne who counsels, commands or advises the commission of a crime. It
will be observed that this definition is much the same as that of an
accessory before the fact. What, then, is the difference between the two?
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communication completes the offense and there need be no uptake on the part
of the listener to commit the crime nor indeed any consequences at all.
Inchoate crimes are crimes of prevention, designed to interdict a harmful
chain of causation once a substantial step has been taken towards
commission. Charging a crime ab initio is the only way to prevent the
offense,162 for instance when there is no time for police action, persuasion,
and counterspeech to do their work.
What is apparent is that if it is to suppress inciting speech, law
enforcement must necessarily engage in risk analysis based upon the context
of the incitement. Prevention is simply impossible without predictive
forecasting of likely consequences. In every incitement trial, the question is
the same: does the speech act directly advocate an offense and if so, then does
the advocacy sufficiently elevate the risk that an offense will ensue, to the
extent that the speech loses its constitutional protection? Once the advocacy
prong is fulfilled and it is established that the speaker possessed the requisite
intention to advocate the commission of the crime, then liability hinges on
whether it is likely that imminent lawless action will occur.
The likelihood that a crime will be committed depends on the
circumstances of the speech act: context is everything. In First Amendment
jurisprudence, it is now received wisdom that, “the character of every act
depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.”163 The same words that
are uncontroversial in a peaceful context may be inciting in a violent scenario;
It is that in incitement the crime has not (or has not necessarily) been
committed, whereas a party cannot be an accessory in crime unless the
crime has been committed. An accessory before the fact is party to
consummated mischief; an inciter is guilty only of an inchoate crime.
Incitement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting GLANVILLE
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 612 (Stevens & Sons eds., 2d ed. 1961)).
162
Incitement overlaps conceptually with attempt, and Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion
in Brandenburg recalls that in Schenck, the defendant was charged with attempts to cause
insubordination in the military and to obstruct enlistment. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 450 (1969). In incitement, the substantial step that warrants intervention is the direct
advocacy of a crime where the commission is imminent and likely. Gideon Yaffe elaborates
on this observation, noting,
In cases of this kind, whether a solicitation is enough for the act element
of the attempt depends on two things: on the nature of the crime and the
circumstances, and on the test that the court in question employs for
determining whether the defendant’s act was enough for the act element
of the attempt.
GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS 197 (2010).
163
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504-05 (1984) (“In each of these areas, the limits of the
unprotected category, as well as the unprotected character of particular communications,
have been determined by the judicial evaluation of special facts that have been deemed to
have constitutional significance.”).
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“[An] utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal
to reason and become part of an instrument of force.”164 After Brandenburg,
imminence and likelihood represent the required contextual elements that
define inciting speech. The actus reus elements of incitement are located
therefore in the actual speech act itself, and in a situation where the
commission of the crime is both imminent and likely. The mens rea of
incitement resides in the direct advocacy of a crime, but advocacy is benign
unless it occurs in a hazardous setting where there is a heightened probability
that the crime will be committed imminently.
Together, imminence and likelihood characterize the potential nexus
between the speech act and the future crime, and therefore could be
considered tests of causation, but because incitement is an inchoate crime,
they are tests of potential, future, or probable causation. The incitement
caselaw says nothing about probable causation, so what exactly is it? Legal
philosophers such as Michael Moore have argued that all causation involves
the elevation of probability, or is, in his words, “chance-raising.”165 For
Moore, chance-raising is a reasonable test of causation, and he observes that
in law, an increase in the probability of effectuating a result is part of the very
definition of cause: “a cause is the raising of the probability of its effect.”166
For their part, courts have studiously avoided all discussion of
probable causation and the relationship between imminence and likelihood.
Nor have they provided any general guidance on how to determine probable
causation as opposed to the conventional garden-variety (completed)
causation usually required in criminal law. As criteria that indicate an
enhanced risk of causation, there is a certain element of redundancy in the
inclusion of both likelihood and imminence, since a bad result which is
imminent is also likely and that which is likely is, probabilistically, more
imminent (or at least more imminent than it was when it was unlikely).
Imminence and likelihood are conceptually interrelated and partially define
one another, according to the expression: “more likely, more imminent,” or
the formula, >L ⇄ >I.
Even though the Brandenburg precedent is fifty years old, contemporary
courts still invoke opaque criteria when evaluating probable causation and when
distinguishing this task from conventional, backward-looking appraisals of
164
Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi., Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.
287, 293 (1941).
165
See MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS
AND METAPHYSICS 307-09 (2009) (noting that “risk-based” liability for raising the
probability of a harm or crime is widely recognized in both criminal and civil responsibility
doctrines).
166
Id. at 307.
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causation. Recalling the adage attributed to the physicist Niels Bohr, “It is difficult
to make predictions, especially about the future,” it is worth acknowledging that
assessing the risk of a future harm is inherently tentative, and is an exercise fraught
with, well, risk. And yet in incitement cases, the police, prosecutors, and the courts
currently possess few analytical tools to engage in risk assessment.
In practice, judges put their faith in conventional heuristics, or mental
shortcuts allowing decisions about complex material, that are part of the habitual
parlance of judging and derived from “common sense.”167 Stated less generously,
judges are deciding incitement cases on the basis of cognitive illusions, hunches,
intuitions, and implicit biases.
As a result of incitement doctrine’s conceptual lacunae, courts have fallen
into three unhealthy habits with respect to the causation dimensions of incitement.
First, they have reverse-engineered probable causation from the concrete
consequences of a speech act, also known as the logical fallacy of post hoc ergo
propter hoc.168 Second, they have advanced confusing and misleading metaphors
of speech to connect public speech to ensuing harms. Finally, they have enunciated
general theories of the relationship between speech and social behavior
that lack any empirical substantiation. We address these three forms of
flawed reasoning in turn.
A. Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc
In key incitement cases, there has been a tendency to analyze risk on the
basis of the putative consequences of speech, and to construe these effects as an
intrinsic and inexorable result of speech. In philosophy as in law, post hoc ergo
propter hoc is a logical fallacy169 that holds (incorrectly) that that if Y occurred
after X, then X must have caused Y. Since the Scottish Enlightenment
philosopher David Hume, however, it is accepted that chronology does not
prove causation. In their landmark treatise Causation in the Law, Hart and

167

Amos Taversky and Daniel Kahneman explain this phenomenon further, stating
This judgmental heuristic is called availability. Availability is a useful clue
for assessing frequency or probability, because instances of large classes
are usually reached better and faster than instances of less frequent classes.
However, availability is affected by factors other than frequency and
probability. Consequently, the reliance on availability leads to predictable
biases . . . .
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman et
al. eds., 1982).
168
Literally, “after this, therefore, because of this.”
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Along with other logical fallacies such as generalization from one occurrence, claimbegging, and tautological argumentation.
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Honoré affirmed that “not all events which follow each other in invariable
sequence are causally related.”170
Unquestionably, harms may occur for reasons that are completely
unrelated to a speech act, for instance when the intended injury is performed
by a person who did not hear the original incitement. Furthermore, a speech
act that directly advocates a crime and substantially raises the risk of
imminent lawless action to a threshold that justifies its banning under law
may not actually trigger the harm. Causation is, after all, probabilistic, and a
communicative input may not generate a criminal outcome in every instance.
Illustrating this phenomenon, the Supreme Court reverse-engineered
imminence and likelihood in Claiborne Hardware when it found that Charles
Evers’ public threat to break the “damn neck” of any individual violating the
boycott of white stores171 was protected speech, but with the qualification that
“[i]f that language had been followed by acts of violence, a substantial
question would be presented whether [the speaker] could be held liable for
the consequences of that unlawful conduct.”172
As it happened, there were multiple acts of violence against African
Americans accused of violating the NAACP’s boycott in Claiborne County,
Mississippi, but the Court discounted this because the violence occurred
some “weeks or months” after Evers’ speech.173 Here, the inchoate character
of the crime of incitement is extinguished when the elements of probable
causation are determined ex post facto by reference to the ensuing
consequences of speech, rather than by reference to the degree to which the
criminal advocacy elevated the risk of violence in the moment and
circumstances in which the advocacy occurred.
Similarly, in McCoy v. Stewart, the Ninth Circuit held that the
defendant’s argument that his advice on how to commit criminal offenses
to members of a street gang called the “Bratz” was mere idle talk would
be nullified,
if the state could prove that the speech actually caused
imminent lawless action. Here, however, McCoy correctly
observes that his words did not actually incite anyone to
commit a crime. There is no evidence in the record that the
Bratz engaged in any crime as a result of his advice. Indeed,
there is no evidence that McCoy’s speech played any part at
all in any crime committed by the Bratz.174
170

H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 15 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1985).
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902 (1982).
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Id. at 928.
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Finally, in American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, the court held that there was no element of
imminence present in the ads that referred to the murder of Jews because no
acts of violence could be attributed to the ads.175 As in Claiborne, the courts
seem to be saying that incitement can only be proven if there is evidence of
actual harm, rather than judging the facts by reference to the ex ante
imminence and likelihood elements of the Brandenburg test.
More examples could be found. What is apparent in each instance is
that the court is mistakenly deciding the elements of imminence and
probability on the basis of what happened next, that is, actual causation
specific to the facts of the case, rather than probable causation at the moment
of the utterance in a particular context. As argued, this constitutes specious
reasoning about the probable causation pertaining to an inchoate crime,
which must be performed ex ante rather than ex post facto.
Determining likelihood and imminence on the basis of outcomes
underlines the deep-seated tension between the probable causation elements
of incitement and the inchoate nature of crime, an unresolved tension that
explains the inconsistencies in reasoning and doctrine. When the putative
consequences of a speech act are invoked in determining the two actus reus
elements of the crime of incitement—imminence and likelihood—then actual
causation becomes an element of the crime and incitement can no longer be
considered an inchoate crime.
Logically, this defeats the preventative ends of making incitement a
crime in the first place, and it compels the potential victims of speech that
incites hate crime to absorb all the risks of the calls to violence against them.
If there is an unspoken consensus that courts will only find incitement when
the crime being incited occurs, and if indictments must demonstrate a causal
nexus between inciting speech and criminal acts, then criminal prosecutors
are likely to wait until a crime has been completed before charging an
individual for incitement. The approach of the courts has thwarted the ends
of crime prevention.
B. Misleading Metaphors of Causation
First Amendment jurisprudence is a metaphor-rich environment in
which judges unleash their lyrical passions. The doyen of First Amendment
poetic license is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who penned such
175

See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 70 F. Supp. 3d 572, 582-83
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The defendants also cannot point to any objective evidence to support
their concerns that the advertisement is an imminent incitement of violence . . . . Therefore,
these ads—offensive as they may be—are still entitled to First Amendment protection.”),
vacated, 109 F. Supp. 3d 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 815 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2016).
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memorable lines as “the word is . . . not transparent . . ., it is the skin of a
living thought . . . .”176 Even more renowned is Holmes’s marketplace of ideas
metaphor which construes public, political speech as a consumer item that
can be freely bought and sold.177 Even though it was coined nearly a hundred
years ago, the marketplace metaphor still has currency in recent First
Amendment cases.178
Some metaphors in incitement rulings are conspicuously causal and
describe the nexus between speech and subsequent action. Causal metaphors
are more than just an attractive adornment to a decision. They do actual work
by verifying the connection between words and acts that may not be easily
discernible in the evidence presented to the court. For instance, in Dennis, a
Red Scare case in which the defendants were convicted simply of reading and
discussing Marxist works, the judgment approvingly cited Judge Learned
Hand in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten: “One may not counsel or advise
others to violate the law as it stands. Words are not only the keys of
persuasion, but the triggers of action . . . .”179
Metaphors of fire and conflagration abound in incitement decisions,
and were particularly a feature of the “bad tendency” or “advocacy alone is
sufficient” standard of incitement.180 In Frohwerk, the U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged that the defendant’s publication of antiwar and pro-Germany
sentiments in the weekly newspaper Missouri Staats-Zeitung seemingly
posed a minimal risk because it was a local Kansas City newspaper
published in German, but the Court convicted him nonetheless on the
grounds that “it is impossible to say that it might not have been found that
176

Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
Holmes called upon this analogy in Abrams v. United States, writing in dissent,
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
178
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010) (asserting
that a previous opinion, overruled by this decision, “interferes with the ‘open marketplace’
of ideas protected by the First Amendment”); Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228,
243 (6th Cir. 2015), (“The First Amendment offers sweeping protection that allows all
manner of speech to enter the marketplace of ideas.”).
179
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 571 (1951) (quoting Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten,
244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)).
180
They did not, therefore, originate in another Holmes’s aphorism that “[t]he most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and
causing panic.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
177
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the circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath would be
enough to kindle a flame and that the fact was known and relied upon by
those who sent the paper out.”181
The conviction of Socialist Party of America member Benjamin
Gitlow relied on a similar combustion metaphor regarding the potential harms
of political speech when it held that “[a] single revolutionary spark may
kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and
destructive conflagration.”182 Fire and conflagration metaphors abound in
recent cases such as United States v. White, in which the Seventh Circuit held
that the white supremacist website posting the name of a jury foreman and
inviting readers to harm him was “playing with fire,”183 adding yet more
redolent imagery to the district court’s metaphor of speech as “powerful
medicine” in that case.184
Some legal scholars have objected to the prevalence of
metaphorical and figurative language in judgments.185 Felix Cohen
famously excoriated the U.S. Supreme Court’s figurative language in
deciding where a company resided (and therefore could be sued) in Tauza
v. Susquehanna Coal Company.186 Cohen condemned the Court’s use of
181

Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919).
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925).
183
United States v. White, 698 F.3d 1005, 1014 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The fact that White made
an effort to discourage assassination attempts against Juror A when law enforcement moved
against his website shows at a minimum that he knew he was playing with fire.”).
184
As Judge Adelman held in another United States v. White opinion,
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands
of each of us . . . .
638 F. Supp. 2d 935, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
185
See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 812 (1935) (describing the use of metaphor in jurisprudence a distraction from the
actual “social forces which mold the law and the social ideas by which the law is to be
judged”). See generally RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, INCITEMENT ON TRIAL: PROSECUTING
INTERNATIONAL SPEECH CRIMES 152-65 (2017) (detailing historical ambivalence about the
use of metaphor in jurisprudence and concluding that such the rhetorical device is often used
“in a way that is misleading and rests on a defective psychology”).
186
See generally Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (1917) (describing the
relevant corporation’s objection that it could not be sued in New York, even though it
regularly conducted business there, because it was headquartered and established somewhere
else). Responding to the decision in Tauza, Cohen wrote,
Yet it is exactly in these terms of transcendental nonsense that the Court of
Appeals approached the question of whether the Susquehanna Coal
Company could be sued in New York State. ‘The essential thing,’ said
Judge Cardozo, writing for a unanimous court, ‘is that the corporation shall
182
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metaphor and analogy in determining the factual question, “where is a
corporation?” on the grounds that symbolic discourse interfered with a
rational and scientific deliberation of the facts of the case.187 Since Cohen,
philosophers have developed a critique of metaphorical language and
argued that metaphors are not propositional in character,188 are confusing,
emotive, and unsuited to serious scientific inquiry,189 and are “empty of
guidance for the court.”190
Metaphors are not simply adornments in First Amendment law, and
as the linguistic philosopher J.L. Austin observed, they do things.191
Metaphors convert the complex relationship between a speech act and its
context into a set of physical objects that make up the material-object
world, transforming what are in fact social relations (how a speaker might
goad others into acts of violence) into material-object-world relations.
Metaphors of fire or medicine allow judges to posit a mechanistic causal
relationship between advocacy and behavior. When courts perceive
speech as analogous to a smoldering fire or “triggers of action” or
“powerful medicine,” they characterize the possible mental causation
between persons in the paradigm of physical laws of cause and effect, laws
that more easily conform to criminal law’s standard model of causation.
Yet this analogy is built on a false premise. Unlike fire or medicine,
humans possess intentionality and agency,192 and the intersubjective dynamics
have come into the State.’ Why this journey is essential, or how it is
possible, we are not informed. The opinion notes that the corporation has
an office in the State, with eight salesmen and eleven desks, and concludes
that the corporation is really ‘in’ New York State. From this inference it
easily follows that since a person who is in New York can be sued here,
and since a corporation is a person, the Susquehanna Coal Company is
subject to suit in a New York court
Cohen, supra note 185, at 811-12.
187
Cohen, supra note 185, at 811 (critiquing Judge Cardozo’s choice of transcendental
language to describe the legal location of a corporation).
188
See Donald Davidson, What Metaphors Mean, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND
INTERPRETATION 262 (2d ed. 2001) (denying that metaphors stand for specific facts or have
“specific cognitive content”).
189
Id. at 247.
190
HART & HONORÉ, supra note 170, at 97.
191
J.L. AUSTIN, How to Do Things With Words, in THE WILLIAM JAMES LECTURES
DELIVERED AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY IN 1955 6 (1962) (“[T]o utter the sentence . . . is not
to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am
doing it: it is to do it.”).
192
By “agency” we refer to intentionality and a minimum capacity to take preliminary steps
towards the fulfillment of the intention. See JOHN R. SEARLE, RATIONALITY IN ACTION 9596 (2001) (identifying the following feature of a rational agent: she is conscious, persists
through time, operates with reasons, and is capable of deciding, initiating and carrying out
actions and is responsible for at least some of her behavior).
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of persuasion between persons is more complicated than a fire spreading
through a forest or a medicine being administered to a patient. In addition to
raising valid due process concerns (how does one appeal against a conviction
written in flights of figurative fancy?), metaphors hinder our comprehension of
how exactly and realistically an advocacy might have increased the likelihood
of an imminent offense. As an antirealist language, metaphors should not serve
as the basis of legal reasoning, especially when they contemplate the contextual
elements of speech.193 Metaphorical language of the type that is often present
in calls to violence ought to be met with sober deliberation in the courts, not yet
more metaphorical speech.
C. Baseless Theories of Speech
“[W]hen we don’t have enough knowledge to decide a case in
an informed way, we necessarily fall back on how we ‘feel’
about the case.”
–Judge Richard A. Posner194
This Section demonstrates that in First Amendment cases, judges are
often prone to making generalized assertions about social behavior, and in
particular, about the likely consequences of speech that provokes a violent
response, or which denigrates or threatens a social group. These claims are
seldom, if ever, accompanied by empirical substantiation of any kind, and appear
to be based on the judges’ intuitions, unconscious biases, and rules of thumb.
Some judicial statements about the effects of speech are plausible,
others are utterly implausible, but whatever the case, judicial declarations are
often made without any supporting evidence, and therefore are unverified.
And yet these claims can play an essential role in the judges’ reasoning in
hard cases. For example, Justice Brandeis claimed in Whitney that “It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears,”195
although that would obviously depend on the kind of speech. Self-evidently,
political speech can inculcate irrational fears and instigate public disorder and
violence, otherwise there would be no basis for laws regulating incitement,
true threats, and fighting words.
193

See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co. 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1926) (“Metaphors in
law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it."). See generally Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1162–63 (1989)
(summarizing critiques of metaphors in legal reasoning).
194
Joel Cohen, An Interview with Judge Richard A. Posner, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2014, 10:20 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/an_interview_with_judge_richard_a._posner [https
://perma.cc/7868-JQT5].
195
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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Further in this vein, in deciding that the burning of the American flag
was constitutionally protected speech, the Supreme Court stated in Texas v.
Johnson that taking “serious offense” at an expression is not “necessarily
likely” to provoke a disturbance of the peace.196 The conjoining of
“necessarily” and “likely” seems like clever hedging on the part of the
Justices, and leaves imprecise the Court’s opinion on the nature of the
probabilistic relationship between taking serious offence and subsequent
disorder. Of course, the taking of offense does not necessarily cause violence
in all instances. However, behavioral research on the defilement of national
symbols indicates that taking serious offense does increase the chances that
there will be disorder. For instance, moral foundations psychologist
Jonathan Haidt writes about how the flag is conceived as “one of the sacred
pillars supporting the community” and an object of “infinite value,” the
desecration of which is sure to lead to a response that is “swift, emotional,
collective and punitive.”197
Judicial decisions frequently pronounce on the nature of the harms
experienced by historically disadvantaged communities subjected to true
threats and incitement in an evidentiary vacuum. Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority in the cross-burning case of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, struck
down the city ordinance banning cross-burning and daubing swastikas by
reasoning that injury caused by an expression of group hatred is not
“qualitatively different” from injury which does not invoke group hatred.198
No evidence is provided for this assertion, which set off a lively debate
between the majority and Justice Stevens, who wrote a concurring opinion,
about whether the denigration of a person’s race is of a qualitatively different
order than speech that disparages their personal characteristics.199
This question has been tested empirically, and the social science
literature has identified the uniquely harmful effects of racist speech. In two
experiments, psychologists Boeckman and Liew tested Asian American
196

See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408 (1989) (“The State’s position, therefore, amounts
to a claim that an audience that takes serious offense at particular expression is necessarily
likely to disturb the peace and that the expression may be prohibited on this basis. Our
precedents do not countenance such a presumption.”).
197
See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY
POLITICS AND RELIGION 174 (2012) (describing emotional and punitive responses to the
desecration of the flag).
198
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1992) (discounting Justice
Stevens’s claim that there was a “qualitatively different” type of injury targeted by the
ordinance relevant for first amendment analysis).
199
See id. at 392 (providing Justice Scalia’s opinion on the meaning of “qualitatively
different” in context, which conflicts with Justice Stevens’ view); see also id. at 424-25
(Stevens, J., concurring) (providing an alternative approach to Justice Scalia’s analysis).
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students’ responses to racist speech relative to personal forms of insult, and
their reactions to offenses that are motivated by group hatred (e.g., insulting
speech) to those that are not (e.g., petty theft).200 They found that hate speech
depressed collective self-esteem201 and caused more extreme emotional
reactions than insults not based on group hatred. They concluded that hate
speech is “distinctive”202 and has a “broader harmful impact . . . than other
forms of insult or property crime.”203 In the light of this study and others,204
Justice Scalia’s claims run contrary to the scientific evidence and therefore
represent mere personal opinion.
Then there are the customary yardsticks used by the Court to measure
the likely responses to provocation and therefore the likelihood of imminent
lawless action. One objective standard found in fighting words doctrine is
how the “average person” might respond, a thesis that originates in the
“reasonable man” test for standards of care and foreseeability in tort law, as
introduced by Justice Holmes.205 In First Amendment cases, the average
person standard can serve as a legal fiction that cloaks the opinions and
prejudices of the majority as to the kind of speech acts that give offense and
prompt public disorder.
In Bible Believers, the Sixth Circuit held that carrying a severed pig’s
head on a stick and placards stating that the Prophet Muhammed is a fraud and
a pedophile was not speech “likely to provoke the average person.”206 Who
exactly is the “average person” here? They do not seem to be a follower of the
prophet Muhammed and the religion of Islam. The Court would have been well
advised to avoid adopting a majoritarian (i.e., Christian) religious vantagepoint
from which to evaluate how the Muslim community of Dearborn, Michigan
200

Robert J. Boeckmann & Jeffrey Liew, Hate Speech: Asian American Students’ Justice
Judgments and Psychological Responses, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 363, 363 (2002).
201
Id. at 377.
202
Id. at 379.
203
Id. at 365.
204
See, e.g., Laura Beth Nielsen, Subtle, Pervasive, Harmful: Racist and Sexist Remarks in
Public as Hate Speech, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 265, 279 (studying the prevalence and severe effects
of racist and sexist speech in public places); see also Brian Mullen & Joshua M. Smyth,
Immigrant Suicide Rates as a Function of Ethnophaulisms: Hate Speech Predicts Death, 66
PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 343, 343 (2004) (studying the correlation between ethnic slurs and
suicide in immigrant populations).
205
In The Common Law, Holmes sought to resolve the problem of negligence in torts law by
creating an objective standard to determine what outcomes are foreseeable from individual
actions, so as to attribute liability in a credible manner. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 93 (1881) (describing the reasonable man test for foreseeable “consequences”
that ought result in liability in tort).
206
Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 246 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969), which held that no advocacy can constitute fighting
words unless it is “likely to provoke the average person to retaliation”).
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might (and in fact, did, repeatedly) react to the evangelical group’s provocations.
Instead, the court’s standard for inciting public disorder might begin with the
attitudes and values of the members of the group who are the target of abusive
and inciting speech. That is, how are most Muslims in Dearborn, Michigan likely
to react to religiously based insults from the Bible Believers evangelical group?
Indeed, an empirically verifiable standard of the risk of provocation was
available to the Court, insofar as the Bible Believers’ speech had already
prompted public disorder at the Arab International Festival in 2011, the year
preceding the events in question.207 In response, the Bible Believers group
ratcheted up their religious baiting at the 2012 cultural festival by parading with
placards that expressed even more offensive insults about the prophet
Muhammed and by carrying a severed pig’s head on a stick.
It has been established in other cases that when evaluating whether a
speech act constitutes incitement, it is imperative to understand how the
speaker’s intended audience, not the “average person” or the general public,
would have understood her words.208 There is precedent in First Amendment
law for evaluating the likely consequences of a speech act on the basis of its
ordinary meaning for its intended audience, rather than the legal fiction of the
“average person.” For instance, Gitlow affirmed that,
The court, among other things, charged the jury, in substance,
that they must determine what was the intent, purpose and fair
meaning of the Manifesto; that its words must be taken in their
ordinary meaning, as they would be understood by people whom
it might reach.209
As we have demonstrated, judges often rely on metaphors that are
misleading and non-falsifiable in incitement cases. They make generalized
statements unsupported by any empirical research and employ standards to
gauge likely responses that are not objective and as we just saw in Bible
Believers, can convey majoritarian religious biases. Personal experience and
the evidence presented in the trial are not be a sound basis for calculating risk.
Determinations of fact that rely on a general model of speech and behavior
and that lack empirical substance are therefore specious. In their desire to
prioritize normative principles, decisions in incitement cases such as Bible

207

Id. at 236.
The same words may have entirely different meanings depending on the specific audience.
Compare Saylor v. Bd. of Educ. of Harlan Cty, Ky., 118 F.3d 507, 509 (6th Cir. 1997)
(describing the statement “I’ll take care of him” being taken to mean corporal punishment),
with United States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d 537, 550 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing defendant’s
promise to “take care of [him],” which witness understood as sharing proceeds of robbery).
209
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 661 (1925).
208
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Believers, R.A.V., and Texas v. Johnson have made proclamations about
social behavior that are contradicted by behavioral research.
A sounder basis for determining imminence and likelihood in
incitement cases would involve disaggregating the brute facts from the guiding
principles and accepting the facts of the case on the basis of the observed pattern
of behavior, informed by relevant social science research on the topic. When
the facts are congruent with the extant policy, then all is well. If the facts
contradict the policy, then it is inadvisable, as courts have occasionally done, to
reconfigure the facts to conform to the preferred policy.
Of course, even if the behavioral research does not support current
policy, there may still exist compelling normative reasons to maintain the policy
anyway. Where the facts of the matter are inconsistent with the desired policy
of the court, for instance, arguendo, that flag burning creates widespread offense
and offense is more likely to lead to violence, courts and legislatures may still
decide to permit flag burning for other reasons, for instance, because they value
vigorous political protest of a symbolic kind. We term this elevation of policy
considerations over countervailing material facts in incitement law a “normative
override.”210 Rather than concocting an implausible interpretation of the facts
to suit the desired policy, it is preferable to acknowledge explicitly that the
courts are engaging in a normative override.
There is much work to be done with respect to the probable causation
elements of incitement doctrine and procedure. The consistency and
predictability of the law of incitement would be enhanced if courts were
transparent in advance about the criteria they use to evaluate the content and
context of speech to determine whether it could foreseeably result in
imminent lawless action.
IV. A MATRIX FOR ASSESSING RISK
“How are we going to substitute a realistic, rational, scientific
account of legal happenings for the classical theological
jurisprudence of concepts?”
–Felix Cohen211
For much of U.S. history, the crime of incitement was an
instrument to suppress seditious and antiwar speech.212 In the midtwentieth century, courts began to orient doctrine to protecting individuals

210

To our knowledge, “normative override” has not been previously used in this way in legal
scholarship.
211
See Cohen, supra note 185, at 821.
212
See supra Subsection I.C.
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from harm motivated by group bias.213 This transition is still incomplete.
In order to complete it, First Amendment analysis in incitement cases must
engage more fully in a contextual risk analysis.
The idea of risk assessment was introduced in the “clear and
present danger” test, but its promise was never fully realized, and the test
became a repressive tool.214 The fetters were lifted in Brandenburg which
announced the elements of imminence and likelihood but did not define
them.215 Consequently, judges and other legal actors have relied on models
of speech that are metaphorical and inaccurate.216 As a result, the elements
remain obscure, leaving the targets of incitement unprotected. The
incitement matrix below offers an evidence-based approach to risk
assessment informed by the latest research on the relationship between
speech and behavior.217 The factors are organized under three general
headings: the attributes of the speaker, the content of the message, and the
context in which the message is delivered. Each is known to elevate the
probability that listeners will act on criminal advocacy.
The proposed incitement scale delivers a more transparent and
rational basis for evaluating the risks associated with specific speech acts
than the hodge-podge of folk theories currently circulating in First
Amendment law. It does, however, raise the question of the appropriate
relationship between law and social science. After Brown cited
psychological research to reject the notion of “separate but equal,” there
emerged a voluminous literature on the place of social science in law, and
space constraints do not allow us to review it comprehensively.218 Our

213

See supra Subsection I.D.
See supra Section II.D.
215
See supra Section II.E.
216
See Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in
the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2003) (proposing an application of behavioral
analysis to risk in First Amendment law).
217
For a summary chart, see supra Appendix. Susan Benesch presents her own matrix for
direct and public incitement to genocide. See Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable
Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 493-94 (2008) (proposing a
new spectrum and definition for evaluating indictment to genocide). Her matrix is a dramatic
improvement on what came before in the international law of direct and public incitement to
commit genocide. Our matrix differs from hers in two respects: it is informed by social
research and it focuses on Brandenburg and U.S. law rather than international criminal law.
See also Richard Ashby Wilson, Inciting Genocide with Words, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 277,
300-04 (2015) (evaluating Benesch’s framework).
218
See generally Rachel F. Moran, What Counts as Knowledge? A Reflection on Race, Social
Science, and the Law, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 515 (2010) (reviewing social science in the law
since Brown).
214
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sympathies are with legal scholars such as Cass Sunstein who embrace
behavioral research and aspire to make government logical.219
It is worth noting that risk assessment based on behavioral research is
already an existing component of the criminal justice system and shapes judicial
decisions on a daily basis.220 Although not an incitement case, Harper v. Poway
Unified School District cited numerous social science studies to justify the
decision that a high school could suspend a student for wearing a T-shirt with a
message expressing religious condemnation of homosexuality.221 The statistical
evidence Harper cited was particularly compelling: “[A]mong teenage victims of
anti-gay discrimination, 75% experienced a decline in academic performance,
39% had truancy problems and 28% dropped out of school.”222
The Ninth Circuit concluded that “Harper’s wearing of his T-shirt
‘colli[des] with the rights of other students’ in the most fundamental way,”223
citing eight studies that demonstrate that verbal attacks on students because of
their sexual orientation lead to a significant and measurable decline in future
academic performance and their potential success in later life.224 Subsequently,
the passage of Harper citing relevant social science studies has been reproduced
verbatim in Gillman, another First Amendment case.225 While our advocacy of
the relevance of social science to legal problems is robust, our approach is
cautious and prudent, and we advise a limited application of our ten-point
incitement scale. The matrix only applies to the imminence and probability
prongs of the three-part Brandenburg test, after it has been established that
there is advocacy of imminent lawless action.
Furthermore, the objection might be raised that the matrix contemplates
a review of the status of the speaker and the content of their message as relevant
contextual factors, and in Citizens United and Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the U.S.
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Cass R. Sunstein, Making Government Logical, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/opinion/sunday/cass-sunstein-making-governmentlogicalhtml.html [https://perma.cc/9C8R-26FK]; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
USING SCIENCE AS EVIDENCE IN PUBLIC POLICY (Kenneth Prewitt et al. eds., 2012)
(discussing the use of behavioral research in federal agency programs).
220
See JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 398-409 (7th ed. 2010) (discussing the uses of social science in the
determination of future facts). For a critical view of prediction in criminal law, see also
Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 301, 303-04 (2015) (providing a critical view of the uses of social science in the
determination of future facts, especially in a criminal law context).
221
Harper v. Poway Unified School Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178-79, 1184 (9th Cir. 2006).
222
Id. at 1179.
223
Id. at 1178 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
224
Id. at 1179.
225
Gillman v. Sch. Bd. for Holmes Cty., Fla., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1370 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
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Supreme Court countenances neither content-viewpoint discrimination nor
speaker-identifying factors in First Amendment analysis.226
With respect to possible content or viewpoint discrimination, our scale
does not replace existing tests for criminal advocacy. The risk assessment
matrix is only pertinent once it has been established that the speech in question
advocates a crime. Furthermore, the three content-related factors in the matrix
all contain a call to violence, speech that is already prohibited under existing
law of true threat and incitement. The factors are therefore consistent with
prevailing prohibitions on criminal advocacy. Additionally, we advise that the
presence of one or more factors is not in itself predictive of imminent lawless
action. Instead, it is the ensemble of factors that may be jointly sufficient. The
presence of one to three factors indicates low risk, four to six factors indicates
medium risk and seven to ten factors indicates high risk. Thus, the matrix can
be exculpatory as well as inculpatory.
With respect to speaker-identifying factors, consideration of the
speaker’s corporate identity was permissible for many years on the basis of
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which allowed the regulation of
corporate funding of elections from general funds to prevent the appearance
of corruption in politics.227 While space does not allow us to develop the
argument here, we favor the approach adopted in Austin, which was overruled
by Citizens United, a decision that has generated more negative comment
than most. That being said, the reasons given by the Court for excluding
consideration of the speaker’s identity in Citizens United are not present in
our matrix. That decision states that courts cannot restrict political speech on
the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity,228 but our scale does not specify
any identity, corporate or otherwise. Nor may the government distinguish
between speakers as a way of controlling content according to Citizens
United,229 but our scale does not seek to suppress content via a speaker’s identity.
Finally, Citizens United holds that government restrictions may not
disfavor certain types of speakers,230 but our scale also does not do that; it
simply notes that the more authoritative, credible and charismatic speakers
are for their audience (i.e., regardless of ideological viewpoint or their
specific political party membership), the more likely it is that their words will
226

See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010) (opining that
political speech may not be banned on the basis of the speaker’s identity); see also Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (2015) (holding that laws restricting speech
based on its content are presumptively unconstitutional); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn.,
505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (stating that laws regulating speech must be content neutral).
227
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990).
228
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 315.
229
Id. at 312.
230
Id. at 313-14.
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influence audience behavior. In our view, it is impossible to evaluate a speech
act in its context and the probability that it will provoke imminent lawless
action without considering the attributes of a speaker and his or her
relationship with an audience. Such analysis is compatible with, and indeed,
demanded by, existing First Amendment jurisprudence.
Research on the effects of speech on listeners has made enormous
strides since Brandenburg was decided in 1969, and we know much more
about the ways that directly inciting speech can impact behavior than before.
The next Section of this Article offers an incitement scale of ten factors to
assist courts and policymakers as they assess the risk that an incitement could
lead to imminent lawless action. It distills the most up-to-date behavioral and
social research on persuasion, political communication and denigrating
speech into a checklist that can be operationalized by legal actors.
A. The Attributes of the Speaker
1. The speaker occupies an official position of authority within
government or a political party or political movement.
If an authority figure exhorts violence or other persons appear to
accept violent exhortations, then a majority of individual listeners will
likely conform to the authority’s message, even if they disagree with it.
The power of an authority figure’s words was clearly demonstrated in
Milgram’s famous experiments in which otherwise normal and empathetic
individuals (“teachers”) would obey an authority’s instructions to
administer seemingly deadly electrical shocks to innocent victims
(“learners”).231 For decades, psychologists asked “Would people still obey
today?” Burger replicated Milgram’s results in 2009, finding that nearly
three-quarters of participants delivered “shocks” as instructed.232 In recent
variation on Milgram’s study, Mermillod and colleagues found that most
participants comply with an authority’s destructive requests, such as
insulting another person, even when there is little or no pressure to do
so.233 Focusing on the underlying cognition of obedience, Grzyb and
colleagues discovered that obedience to an authority can be elicited with
as little as the would-be follower sharing an aspect of the authority’s social
231
See Stanley Milgram, Liberating Effects of Group Pressure, 1 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC.
PSYCHOL. 127, 134 (1965) (discussing obedience to authority figures and the moderating
role of group conformity).
232
Jerry M. Burger, Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today?, 64 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1, 8 (2009).
233
Martial Mermillod et al., Destructive Obedience Without Pressure: Beyond the Limits of
the Agentic State, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 350 (2015).
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identity, such as gender, or possessing a high need for cognitive closure
(i.e., desire to remove ambiguity from the world).234
These findings extend to numerous studies of social groups. In
Asch’s experiments on intragroup behavior, many participants submitted
to the collective’s patently false beliefs about the world if they were
outnumbered or under the observation of an authority figure.235
Zimbardo’s famous Stanford Prison Experiment elicited similar behavior
when participants (“guards”) physically abused others (“prisoners”) or
conformed to an authority figure’s instructions to control prisoners. 236 In
a real-world scenario, Straus recently analyzed twenty-four cases of mass
violence in Africa, discovering that the most critical factor in each case
was government authorities who encouraged violence and also
coordinated it through their speech acts.237 Other recent studies on mass
violence corroborate Straus’s findings and show that the greater the
authority of the speaker, the more likely a community will conform to the
individuals verbal instructions to commit violent acts.238
2. The speaker is perceived by supporters as credible or charismatic.
Whereas authority is associated with an individual’s formal position
in a social hierarchy, credibility is a communicative construct that derives
from a leader’s personal qualities such as expertise, relatability, and
trustworthiness. To be effective, a credible group leader must also balance
multiple commitments while signaling dedication to his or her base,239
234

See generally Tomasz Grzyb et al., Cognitive Structuring and Obedience Toward
Authority, 135 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE 115 (2018) (discussing personal
traits that make individuals susceptible to obedience to authority).
235
See Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 SCI. AM. 31, 32-33 (1955)
(discussing social conformity to the opinions of others).
236
See generally Craig Haney, Curtis Banks & Philip Zimbardo, Interpersonal Dynamics in
A Simulated Prison, 1 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69 (1973); Phil Banyard,
Tyranny and the Tyrant: From Stanford to Abu Ghraib, 20 THE PSYCHOLOGIST 494, 494
(2007) (discussing film footage of the experiment that shows Zimbardo behaving as an
authority figure, demanding that the guards restrict the prisoners’ freedom, a demand to
which they conformed).
237
SCOTT STRAUS, MAKING AND UNMAKING NATIONS: WAR, LEADERSHIP, AND GENOCIDE
IN MODERN AFRICA 92, 99 (2015).
238
SARAH SORIAL, SEDITION AND THE ADVOCACY OF VIOLENCE: FREE SPEECH AND
COUNTER-TERRORISM 2, 84-85, 115-16 (2012).
239
See generally Richard J.B. Bosworth & Joseph A. Maiolo, Introduction to Volume II, and
Introduction to Part I, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1-20,
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usually through making politically appropriate promises and delivering on
them, while also not benefiting other groups more.240 This raises the question
of how leaders maintain credibility while leading their group into conflict.
Leaders in conflict situations or societies with a history of intractable
conflicts often frame precarious circumstances in culturally salient ways that
resonate with their followers.241 As an illustration, Benford and Snow’s
review of conflicts and social movements revealed that leaders who sustain
their credibility are often those who speak with a “narrative fidelity,” such that
their words reinforce their group’s ideologies and myths.242
While credibility promotes trust, a leader’s charisma provides him or her
with power, and even the perception of having spiritual, if not magical-like
abilities, by his or her followers.243 Even when lacking expertise, communicators
who have charisma—perceived authenticity, honesty, and physical presence—
can attain positions of authority and become quite persuasive, especially during
periods of crisis or rapid social change.244 As Weber observed, charismatic
leaders often attract followers full of “enthusiasm, or of despair and hope.”245
Since charismatic leaders often contest traditional or bureaucratic authorities,
they can typically break with established norms.246 Despite breaking traditional
norms, charismatic leaders are often highly successful and persuasive because
they are masters of nonverbal and verbal communication. For instance, they
(Michael Geyer & Adam Tooze eds., 2015) (addressing the role of leaders and their signaled
devotion to constituents when discussing the role of ideological commitments in the World
War II); Roseanne W. McManus, Making it Personal: The Role of Leader-Specific Signals
in Extended Deterrence, 80 J. POL. 982, 982-95 (2018) (discussing the balance leaders must
strike between signaling commitments to their own country and weaker states).
240
See, e.g., James H. Read & Ian Shapiro, Transforming Power Relationships: Leadership,
Risk, and Hope, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 40, 45-47 (2014) (using the case study of Mandela
and de Klerk to illustrate the importance of their credibility and risk-taking in leading their
constituencies to a peaceful solution in South Africa).
241
See Stuart J. Kaufman, Symbols, Frames, and Violence: Studying Ethnic War in the
Philippines, 55 INT'L. STUD. Q. 937, 943-46 (2011); see also Daniel Bar-Tal, Neta Oren, &
Rafi Nets-Zehngut, Sociopsychological Analysis of Conflict-Supporting Narratives: A
General Framework, 51 J. PEACE RES. 662-75 (2014) (analyzing the recurrence of conflictsupporting narratives that draw upon culturally accepted stories or frames to justify
intergroup conflicts and thereby satisfy the basic psychological needs of the collective).
242
See Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An
Overview and Assessment, ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 622 (2000).
243
See generally S. Abbruzzese, Charisma: Social Aspects of, in 8 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1653 (Paul B. Baltes & Neil J.
Smelser eds., 2001); Caitlin Andrews-Lee, The Revival of Charisma: Experimental Evidence
from Argentina and Venezuela, 52 COMP. POL. STUD. 688-95 (2019); Yasmeen Yousif
Pardesi & Yousif Pardesi, Charismatic Leadership: A Critical Analysis, 2 GOV. ANN. RES.
J. POL. SCI. 71-76 (2013).
244
MAX WEBER, ON CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING 49, xiv-lvi, 18-27, 254-57 (1968).
245
Id at 49.
246
Id. at 24.
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often modulate radically the volume and tempo of their speeches.247
Additionally, charismatic leaders frame their goals in terms of the success of the
ingroup,248 using “us” and “them” rhetoric and stressing the vital importance of
giving oneself to the group. 249 The latter is known as “ego surrender” and is a
common appeal made by charismatic leaders of sociopolitical movements, as
well as religious communities and cults, which encourage followers to find
purpose and meaning in surrendering to the group and, by extension, the leader.
3. The speaker has regular access to means of mass communication,
or the ability to control information, or to suppress alternative
sources of information.
Since Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism,250 scholars have
advanced the claim that authoritarian leaders seek to control information by
hindering alternative political voices, while totalitarians strive to exercise
personal and absolute control over information.251 A leader may suppress
alternative sources of information indirectly by placing party loyalists in official
positions overseeing mass communication or directly by attacking the news
media, including encouraging attacks on dissenting journalists.252 For Maynard
247

Oliver Niebuhr, Jana Voße & Alexander Brem, What Makes a Charismatic Speaker? A
Computer-Based Acoustic-Prosodic Analysis of Steve Jobs’ Tone of Voice, 64 COMPUTERS
HUM. BEHAV. 366, 376-78 (2016).
248
See generally Saul L. Miller, Jon K. Maner, & D. Vaughn Becker, Self-Protective Biases
in Group Categorization: Threat Cues Shape the Psychological Boundary Between “Us”
and “Them,” 99 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 62-77 (2010) (addressing the vulnerability
of groups to engage in bias toward others from outgroup categorization); Henri Tajfel, Social
Identity and Intergroup Behavior, 13 SOC. SCI. INFO. 65 (1974) (providing a general
definition of “in-group” for the social sciences as a group of people who see themselves as
sharing an identity and interest, and generally a sense of otherness or exclusivity as regards
all nonmembers of the group. An out-group is any group of people who are seen as not
belonging to the in-group of the speaker and his or her primary audience).
249
See Loretta S. Wilson & Susan Kwileck, Are These People Crazy, or What? A Rational
Choice Interpretation of Cults and Charisma, 19 HUMANOMICS 29, 30 (2003).
250
See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (Harcourt 1973)
(explaining how the roots of totalitarianism lie in a strong leader’s charisma, ideology, and
ability to sweep a people under the total arm of a regime by promising a utopia, while
authoritarianism centers on total power).
251
See, e.g., JUAN J. LINZ, TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 67-70 (2000) (contrasting
the methods by which authoritarian and totalitarian regimes seek to control their population).
252
NATASHA EZROW & ERICA FRANTZ, DICTATORS AND DICTATORSHIPS: UNDERSTANDING
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND THEIR LEADERS 9-10, 192-93, 223 (2011) (addressing how
the structure and effects of political regimes leaning towards or embracing dictatorship share
the characteristic of elites mutually profiting from abuse and corruption such as controling
or monopolizing the media and military).
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and Benesch, potentially dangerous leaders are those who attempt to control or
erode systems of alternative information, since this practice correlates with
violent regimes and is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for genocide.253
For instance, in a survey of over one hundred states from 1960 to 1999, Smith
found that authoritarian repression, including stifling alternative sources of
information, correlates with political violence unless a regime has a durable
natural resource such as oil.254
Most countries have moral and legal injunctions against interpersonal
violence, 255 but if citizens hear repeated exhortations from their leaders to
commit violence against an outgroup, they may conclude that the usual strictures
have been lifted. Moreover, persons may weigh the consequences of their
involvement and come to believe that such violence is justified, necessary, and
likely to go unpunished. Repetitive antisemitic exhortations in multiple domains
of media contributed to the Nazification of Europe in the 1930s.256 Joseph
Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, and Walther Schulze-Wechsungen,
another prominent Nazi propagandist, effectively promoted the repetition of
Nazi ideology as the key to propagandizing the masses. 257 Indeed, mass violence
against a recognizable civilian population is often preceded by a sustained media
campaign that repeats messages of hatred and/or violence.258 Exposure to
repeated messages often creates the illusion that the message is, in fact, true.259
253

Jonathan Leader Maynard & Susan Benesch, Dangerous Speech and Dangerous
Ideology: An Integrated Model for Monitoring and Prevention, 9 GENOCIDE STUD. &
PREVENTION 70, 83 (2016); see also Susan Benesch, The New Law of Incitement to
Genocide: A Critique and a Proposal, DANGEROUS SPEECH PROJECT 9-10 (Apr. 1, 2009),
https://dangerouspeech.org/new-law-of-incitement-to-genocide/ [https://perma.cc/GZ9BTX9S] (laying out Benesch’s preconditions for incitement to genocide).
254
See Benjamin Smith, Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–
1999, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 232, 234, 241 (2004) (“Highly authoritarian regimes actually
experienced considerably higher levels of protest than did others… [but] mechanisms other
than repression drive the relative respite from protest that oil-rich states enjoy.”).
255
By moral injunction we mean a societal imperative informed by a sacred text or accepted
standard of conduct that resembles an ethical or social normative imperative, while by legal
injunction we mean criminal or civil rules that compel or prohibit behavior.
256
Nico Voigtländer & Hans-Joachim Voth, Nazi Indoctrination and Anti-Semitic Beliefs in
Germany, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7931, 7931 (2015).
257
See NICHOLAS O’SHAUGHNESSY, SELLING HITLER: PROPAGANDA AND THE NAZI BRAND
102-08 (2016) (discussing how part of the Nazi theory of mass persuasion involved
repetition, as valued by its highest propagandists, including Goebbels and SchulzeWechsungen).
258
See, e.g., GARTH S. JOWETT & VICTORIA O’DONNELL, PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION 46
(5th ed. 2012) (describing how political leaders incited inter-ethnic hatred in the 1991–1995
Balkans conflict).
259
See generally Lisa K. Fazio et al., Knowledge Does Not Protect Against Illusory Truth,
144 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 993 (2015) (discussing the effects that repeated statements
have on the illusion of truth).
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Exposure to repeated messages also decreases the likelihood in which listeners
are able to discern whether the speaker or media source is disseminating false
information.260
A free media is vital not only for democratic processes but also for
sustained peace. The less control a leader has over the means of
communication, the more likely the public will discover and respond to the
leader’s injustices and thereby remove him or her from office.261 More
critically, the more a leader controls the means of communication, the more
it strengthens his or her regime 262 and, during times of state weakness, the
greater the likelihood of armed conflict.263 In these moments, leaders who
control information and have a ready outlet for their own messages often
distract the public from their misdeeds, such as appropriating resources for
themselves or dividing the public against any political opposition.264
B. The Content of the Message
1. The speaker’s message contains explicit or implicit calls for
violent acts against members of an outgroup.
Yanagizawa-Drott provides compelling evidence that explicit calls
for violence on RTLM radio had a significant impact on the Rwandan
genocide, concluding that: “the main radio station broadcasting anti-Tutsi
propaganda during the Rwandan genocide significantly increased
participation … [by] approximately 10% overall.”265 However, advocates of
violence seldom use direct language, and coded or euphemistic speech is
260

See generally Jason D. Ozubko & Jonathan Fugelsang, Remembering Makes Evidence
Compelling: Retrieval from Memory Can Give Rise to the Illusion of Truth, 37 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 270 (2011) (discussing how
repeated messages create an illusion of truth due to the fluency in retrieved information from
memory).
261
See generally Joan E. Cho, Jae Seung Lee & B.K. Song, Media Exposure and Regime
Support Under Competitive Authoritarianism: Evidence from South Korea, 17 J.E. ASIAN
STUD. 145 (2017) (discussing media control and authoritarian rule in South Korea under Park
Chung Hee).
262
Id. at 148-49.
263
See Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength,
and War, 56 INT’L ORG. 297, 298-99 (2002) (discussing the unique opportunities for armed
conflict during the democratization process).
264
See JACK SNYDER, FROM VOTING TO VIOLENCE: DEMOCRATIZATION AND NATIONALIST
CONFLICT 56 (2000) (describing the conditions within democratizing societies that foster the
acceptance of nationalist ideas).
265
David Yanagizawa-Drott, Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan
Genocide, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1947, 1989 (2014).
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more the norm. Jean Paul Akayesu, for instance, incited mass violence
against Tutsis, who he called inyenzi (“cockroaches”),266 using the expression
“go to work,” which meant “go kill the Tutsis and Hutu political
opponents.”267 Coded or implicit speech relies upon the linguistic and cultural
competency of members of the ingroup, including symbolic and nonlinguistic
background information, allowing only cultural insiders to infer what the
speaker intends.268
For example, an international tribunal found in 2018 that Serb
nationalist politician Vojislav Šešelj instigated persecution (including
forcible displacement and deportation) of Croatians in the Yugoslav Wars
using coded speech particular to Serb nationalism that contained ethnic
and religious slurs and asserted an imaginary boundary of Serbian territory
(viz. “The Karlobag-Karlovac-Ogulin-Virovitica Line”).269 When
compared to direct speech, indirect speech may have an equally powerful,
but more subtle, effect on audiences. In a series of experiments, Eerland
and colleagues observed that participants vividly remembered direct
speech after exposure, while indirect speech was not easily recalled but
participants still showed signs of having encoded the speech’s message
into memory.270 Similarly, Gubler and Kalmoe found that citizens of Israel
and India exposed to indirect calls for violence showed a significant
increase in support for policies harming the outgroup.271 Remarkably,
these effects even influenced persons with low outgroup prejudice and low
aggressive personality traits, and persisted even when persons were
presented with speeches in favor of helping the outgroup.272 Accordingly,
266

Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, ICTR-97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 44(iii) (June 1, 2000).
Id. at ¶ 44(iv).
268
John Searle, Indirect Speech Acts, in 3 SYNTAX & SEMANTICS 60-61 (Peter Cole & Jerry
L. Morgan eds., 1975).
269
Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, MICT -16-99-A, Appeals Proceeding, ¶129-30, 166 (April
11, 2018); see also Anthony Oberschall, Propaganda, Hate Speech and Mass Killings, in
PROPAGANDA, WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM SPEAKERS’ CORNERS
TO WAR CRIMES 171-200 (Predrag Dojčinović ed., 2012) (analyzing propaganda techniques
for inciting mass violence and documenting how Šešelj’s propaganda likely incited mass violence
in the Yugoslav Wars). See generally ANTHONY OBERSCHALL, VOJISLAV ŠEŠELJ’S NATIONALIST
PROPAGANDA: CONTENTS, TECHNIQUES, AIMS AND IMPACTS, 1990–1994. (2006), http://www.
baginst.org/uploads/1/0/4/8/10486668/vojislav_seseljs_nationalist_propaganda-_contents_techniques_aims_and_impacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2WS-PW5U] (providing an overview of
techniques of mass persuasion used by history’s most notorious propagandists to induce the
acceptance of or participation in mass violence, and discussing how Šešelj’s propaganda
parallels mass persuasion intended to incite mass violence).
270
Anita Eerland, Jan A. Engelen & Rolf A. Zwaan, The Influence of Direct and Indirect
Speech on Mental Representations, 8 PLOS ONE, June 12, 2013, at 1, 6, 8.
271
Joshua R. Gubler & Nathan P. Kalmoe, Violent Rhetoric in Protracted Group Conflicts:
Experimental Evidence from Israel and India, 68 POL. RES. Q. 651, 651-52 (2015).
272
Id. at 661.
267
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indirect language may be just as effective if not more effective than direct
language in promoting prejudice or harm against an outgroup.
2. The message dehumanizes an outgroup, or expresses disgust for
an outgroup, or calls for acts of revenge against an outgroup.
In law, dehumanizing language is often seen as the most egregious
form of hate speech, a view with origins in the Nuremberg trials, and
especially the verdict against Nazi propagandist Julius Streicher who
“termed the Jew a germ and a pest, not a human being, but ‘a parasite, an
enemy, an evil-doer, a disseminator of diseases who must be destroyed in
the interest of mankind.’”273 Dower, writing about the conduct of war in
the Pacific during the Second World War, famously opined: “The
dehumanization of the Other contributed immeasurably to the
psychological distancing that facilitates killing.”274 Waldron places a
strong emphasis on language that characterizes members of other racial
groups as “bestial or subhuman.”275 Further, psychological studies have
shown that dehumanizing language predicts intergroup violence.276 This
view of the deleterious effects of dehumanizing language is the accepted
and arguably standard model of hate speech. U.S. courts convicting
individuals of hate crimes have emphasized the dehumanizing language of
defendants, and in the 2018 case of the three Kansas men convicted of a
plot to bomb Somali immigrants, the court heard how one defendant
referred to Muslims as “cockroaches” and to himself as the “Orkin man,”
referencing a pest extermination company.277

273

BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 883 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010).
274
JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR 11 (1986).
275
JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 66 (2012).
276
See generally Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low:
Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847 (2006) (discussing
the propensity of dehumanization to lower empathy for an outgroup); Tage S. Rai, Piercarlo
Valdesolo & Jesse Graham, Dehumanization Increases Instrumental Violence, but Not
Moral Violence, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8511 (2017) (analyzing experimental effects
of dehumanization and finding that dehumanizing language enables violence that
perpetrators see as wrong but necessary).
277
See Mitch Smith, Kansas Trio Convicted in Plot to Bomb Somali Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/us/kansas-militia-somali-trialverdict.html [https://perma.cc/FPU7-FB2C] (reporting on a jury trial in which the
government argued unsuccessfully that the First Amendment protected defendants’
dehumanizing speech).
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Disgust is a central element of moral reasoning and regulating social
behavior generally,278 and can be mobilized by certain speakers to
dehumanize the outgroup. Higher order cognition, such as the executive
functions in normal human interactions with other persons, exhibit low levels
of disgust, as opposed to human interactions with polluting substances, such
as human waste and corpses, which are inanimate and typically elicit high
levels of disgust.279 When feelings of disgust are elicited toward other people,
ordinary projection of an imagined other who possesses a mind and human
feeling is reduced. The result is a dismissal of the agency, intentionality, and
subjectivity of the target of disgust.280 According to Harris and Fiske, when
persons project low warmth and incompetence onto a stigmatized group, such
as the disabled, the poor, drug addicts and immigrants, they also experience
high levels of disgust, thus indicating that perceptions of low warmth and
incompetency go hand-in-hand with disgust and dehumanization.281 Therefore,
speech acts that portray an outgroup with disgust-inducing stimuli, such as pests
or diseases, can stimulate feelings of social disengagement toward the outgroup.
Revenge is a powerful psychological motivation for intra- and
intergroup conflict because it has been naturally selected to deter or
discourage future conspecific threats, to preclude transgressions, and to
reinforce social cooperation.282 These functions of revenge are evident in
studies of punishment and cooperation in game theoretical simulations.283
Studies also show that ingroup members experience a vicarious sense of
moral justification when retribution is carried out on members of an outgroup
for assault or provocation.284 In an experiment using Serb nationalist Vojislav
Šešelj’s speeches, Lillie et al. discovered that revenge speech lowered the
propensity of participants to empathize with the outgroup and increased their
willingness to justify violence morally.285 Moreover, revenge speech
consolidated ingroup identity to the same extent as highly nationalistic
278

See HAIDT, supra note 197, at 21-26 (describing a cross-cultural study in which
participants found “harmless-taboo violations [are] universally wrong” even if no one is
harmed by the violations).
279
See Harris & Fiske, supra note 275, at 852 (finding lower medial prefrontal cortex activity
and higher levels of disgust when participants were shown pictures of extreme outgroups
that were consistent with the way they viewed objects).
280
Id. at 848.
281
Id. at 852.
282
See MICHAEL E. MCCULLOUGH, BEYOND REVENGE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
FORGIVENESS INSTINCT 49 (2008) (discussing revenge as an evolutionary adaptation).
283
Id. at 99-103.
284
Brian Lickel et al., Vicarious Retribution: The Role of Collective Blame in Intergroup
Aggression, 10 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 372, 386 (2006).
285
Jordan Kiper et al., Propaganda, Empathy and Support for Intergroup Violence: the Moral
Psychology of International Speech Crimes 18-19 (Mar. 20, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580521 [https://perma.cc/S2A9-Z2Y8].
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rhetoric.286 Recently, Böhm, Rusch, and Gürerk found that the most direct
and causal motivation for revenge was the felt need to protect the group, so
much so that groups often opt for preemptive force when they believe that
they are victims.287 Such findings are supported by postconflict
ethnographies, such as Mamdani’s, which found that deep-seated notions of
victimhood and revenge motivated many Hutu genocidaires.288
3. The message identifies a direct threat to the ingroup and identifies
a clear and foreseeably violent course of action that can be
imminently taken by listeners to remove the source of the threat.
For political entrepreneurs, a time-honored strategy for mobilizing
supporters is manufacturing indignation about a problem and mobilizing
collective action to address it. Yet, unlike ordinary political entrepreneurs,
authority figures who incite hatred engage in what George calls “contentious
collective action,” in which a speaker convinces followers that they are
wronged by a group and justified in taking action against them.289
Furthermore, the speaker cultivates feelings of righteous indignation around
a master narrative, which often draws from the ingroup’s religion or
worldview, making contentious collective action appear morally right.290
While mob violence and spurious attacks could ensue from such
contentious speech, it is not incitement unless the speaker openly advocates for
the unlawful oppression of, or an explicit attack on, the vilified group.291 Rarely,
though, is violence “sparked” by a single inciting speech, but rather stems from
a combination of factors, including a speech event that draws from the narratives
already cultivated by the speaker within his or her contentious movement.292 A
286

Id.
Robert Böhm, Hannes Rusch & Özgür Gürerk, What Makes People Go to War? Defensive
Intentions Motivate Retaliatory and Preemptive Intergroup Aggression, 37 EVOLUTION &
HUM. BEHAV. 29, 32-33 (2016).
288
See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM,
AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 32-33, 59, 259 (2001) (describing the history and formation
of Hutu and Tutsi as political identities that laid the foundation for the Rwandan genocide).
289
See Cherian George, Hate Spin: The Twin Political Strategies of Religious Incitement and
Offense-Taking, 27 COMM. THEORY 156, 157-58 (2017) (developing the concept of “hate
spin,” defined as “a twin political strategy of incitement and manufactured indignation,
exploiting group identities to mobilize supporters and coerce opponents.”).
290
Id.
291
Id. at 159.
292
See id. at 163 (arguing that the “spark” frame of hate speech is counterproductive to
understanding and combatting religious intolerance); see also SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN
287
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relevant example here is terrorist speech: the messages used by a hate group or
terrorist organization when recruiting, training, planning, financing, and
coordinating its activities.293 At the core of terrorist speech is violent action,
framed within a central narrative—an ideology that justifies violence on account
of group threats or “fighting fire with fire” to achieve a political goal294—as
advocated by the cell’s political entrepreneurs. Thus, when a leader calls for
violence, would-be perpetrators are ready to act.295
A study by Halperin, Canetti-Nisim and Hirsch-Hoefler found that the
combination of group-based hatred with a sense of direct threat is one of the
most significant antecedents for political intolerance and violence in Israel.296
More broadly, a meta-analysis of psychological studies on ingroup threats
and outgroup attitudes discovered that negative outgroup attitudes, such as
hatred and distrust, were significantly influenced by realistic or symbolic
threats posed by an outgroup.297 Such threats increase fears about an outgroup
and support for aggressive policies toward them. A study by Weisel and
Zultan, for example, found that a group under threat is more likely to
contribute materially to a conflict when called upon by others to do so.298
While threatening messages elicit fear, it is worth noting that fear is itself a
complex and unpredictable response. Even if a person is genuinely frightened
by a message, a shift in attitude alone is often not enough to create a
behavioral change, since an affective and cognitive component is necessary
for behavior.299 Consequentially, fear messages are most likely to enact
MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 21 (2d ed. 1998) (“By
drawing on inherited collective identities and shaping new ones, challengers delimit the
boundaries of their respective constituencies and define their enemies. . . .”).
293
See Steven Beale, Online Terrorist Speech, Direct Government Regulation, and the
Communications Decency Act, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 333-34 (2018) (proposing
modifications to the Communications Decency Act to better regulate terrorist hate speech on
social media and online).
294
See Kurt Braddock & John Horgan, Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating
Counternarratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism, 39 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 381,
383 (2015) (describing the narrative form of terrorist messages).
295
See Stephen Reicher & Alexander Haslam, Fueling Extremes, 27 SCI. AM. MIND 34, 39
(2016) (discussing psychological behaviors in terrorist cells).
296
Eran Halperin, Daphna Canetti-Nisim & Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, The Central Role of
Group-Based Hatred as an Emotional Antecedent of Political Intolerance: Evidence from
Israel, 30 POL. PSYCHOL. 93, 115-16 (2009).
297
Blake M. Riek, Eric W. Mania & Samuel L. Gaertner, Intergroup Threat and Outgroup
Attitudes: A Meta-Analytic Review, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 336, 349 (2006).
298
Ori Weisel & Ro’i Zultan, Social Motives in Intergroup Conflict: Group Identity and
Perceived Target of Threat, 90 EUR. ECON. REV. 122, 130 (2016).
299
See Susan T. Fiske & Cydney Dupree, Gaining Trust as Well as Respect in
Communicating to Motivated Audiences about Science Topics, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
13593, 13594 (2014) (evaluating perceptions of climate scientists as a potential barrier to
public trust in their message).
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behavioral changes when there is an identifiable path of action for the listener
to take in order to remove the threat and, thus, the source of fear.300
C. The Context of the Speech
1. There is a history of intergroup conflict between the ingroup and
outgroup, and the number of instances of intergroup violence has
increased overall in the previous twelve months.
A history of conflict between the ingroup and outgroup often precedes
genocide and crimes against humanity and is likely to contribute to mass
atrocities because of unresolved grievances, dysfunctional justice systems,
land disputes, and competition over natural resources.301 Mamdani’s study of
the role of victimhood in the Rwandan genocide302 has convinced scholars to
focus on the combined effect of a history of conflict and a collective memory
of victimhood as factors that indicate a susceptibility to incitement to
genocide.303 A sense of collective victimhood is associated with increased
feelings of vulnerability and mistrust, an expectation of hostility in the future and
a fear of physical or symbolic annihilation; and it is also associated with reduced
guilt and willingness to forgive the outgroup.304 Accordingly, groups with a
history of conflict and an ingroup having a collective memory of victimization
are more likely than others to support aggression towards the outgroup.305
When small-scale intergroup conflict increases, violence becomes
more likely because, in general, there is a decrease in the quality of intergroup
contact, and the ingroup is less likely to oppose leaders who wish to place
restrictions on the outgroup in the name of self-defense.306 For example,
300
RICHARD M. PERLOFF, THE DYNAMICS OF PERSUASION: COMMUNICATION AND ATTITUDES
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 200-01 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing the behavioral changes caused by fear

in circumstances where “people perceive that they are capable of averting the threat”).
301
Leader Maynard & Benesch, supra note 252, at 78.
302
MAMDANI, supra note 287.
303
See generally Noa Schori-Eyal et al., The Shadows of the Past: Effects of Historical Group
Trauma on Current Intergroup Conflicts, 43 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 538
(2017) (discussing associations between collective memories of trauma, victimhood, and
enduring group violence).
304
Id. at 538.
305
Id. at 540 (arguing that perpetual ingroup victim orientation “entails a commitment to the
defense of the ingroup, and consequently greater support for aggressive measures against
enemy outgroups”).
306
Justin T. Pickett et al., Contact and Compromise: Explaining Support for Conciliatory
Measures in the Context of Violent Intergroup Conflict, 51 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 585,
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Pettigrew and Tropp’s meta-analysis of over 500 studies on group
interactions found that increased prejudice and violence toward an outgroup
strongly correlated with diminished intergroup contact.307 Given that frequent
intergroup contact reduces the likelihood of mass violence and increased
conflicts or perceived threats diminish intergroup contact, an increase in
small-scale incidents of violence can render mass violence more imminent by
reducing the mediating effects of intergroup conflict.308
A widely accepted finding on retaliatory violence is that persons who
are identity-fused with their group—i.e., see their personal and group identity
as equivalent—are more likely than others to support or volunteer for
violence against a seemingly perpetrating outgroup.309 For instance, studies
of Israelis during the 2015 Palestinian “Stabbing Intifada”310 and Libyans
during the 2011 revolution311 found that persons who felt fused with their
group predicted endorsement of, or participation in violence. Persons who
experience an exclusive sense of victimhood after an attack on their group—
i.e., that their group alone comprises true victims—are more likely to have
strong negative intergroup attitudes.312 Given human cognitive capacity for
revenge,313 retaliation in a nation-state or region can become especially
dangerous, leading to a cycle of deepening group commitments and
588, 591, 604-05 (2014) (describing how threat-oriented beliefs in a study of Israeli Arabs
and Jews were associated with decreased support for compromise whereas high quality
contact between those groups was associated with increased support for compromise).
307
Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact
Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 766 (2006).
308
Ananthi Al Ramiah & Miles Hewstone, Intergroup Contact as a Tool for Reducing,
Resolving, and Preventing Intergroup Conflict, 68 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 527, 531-32 (2013).
309
Leah A. Fredman, Brock Bastian & William B. Swann, God or Country? Fusion with
Judaism Predicts Desire for Retaliation Following Palestinian Stabbing Intifada, 8 SOC.
PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 882, 882-83, 885 (2017) (“[I]dentity fusion has been
implicated in conflicts in the Middle East. For example, strongly fused persons were
especially inclined to serve as front-line combatants during the 2011 Libyan revolution.”).
310
Id. at 885.
311
Harvey Whitehouse, Brian McQuinn, Michael Buhrmester & William B. Swann, Brothers
in Arms: Libyan Revolutionaries Bond like Family, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 17783,
17784 (2014).
312
See, e.g., Johanna Ray Vollhardt & Rezarta Bilali, The Role of Inclusive and Exclusive
Victim Consciousness in Predicting Intergroup Attitudes: Findings from Rwanda, Burundi,
and DRC, 36 POL. PSYCHOL. 489, 489-506 (2015) (examining the theories and evidence
regarding victim consciousness and empirical support for the hypothesis that exclusive
victimhood consciousness predicts negative intergroup attitudes, while inclusive victimhood
predicts positive intergroup attitudes).
313
See generally Michael E. McCullough, Robert Kurzban & Benjamin A. Tabak, Cognitive
Systems for Revenge and Forgiveness, 36 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (2013) (drawing from
findings in cognitive science to posit that humans have a cognitive system for retaliation,
which was selected to deter harm, and a cognitive system for computing relational costs,
which can function to deter costly conflict).
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escalating intergroup conflict.314 Such violence can lead to collective blame
and vicarious retribution,315 and in the context of a civil war, weaken
institutions and ultimately challenge the control of the State.316
2. There is a major national political election in the next twelve
months or there was a major national political election in the last
twelve months.
For any country, an election year is an important period, but for countries
where elites vie for political dominance amid a system of corrupt and fraudulent
politics, election years can witness dramatic spikes in violence. The spike is
linked to the activity of militias, who often align themselves with armed wings
of political parties in the run-up to elections.317 Under the guise of removing
threatening regimes or protecting threats to the state, militias are often sought by
politicians and loyalists to intimidate or attack political opponents, if not control
entire regional populations.318 Numerous studies reveal, however, that
coordinated attempts to intimidate political opponents do not cause the targeted
communities to retreat from political participation but to engage in it more
vigorously.319 Consequentially, intergroup tensions mount quickly, and violence
can escalate as an instrument of political change.
When election violence is “bottom-up,” it typically involves intermittent
and minor clashes between groups of political oppositions, as witnessed in the
U.S. 2016 presidential election race.320 Election violence is most violent,
314

See, e.g., Robert S. Walker & Drew H. Bailey, Body Counts in Lowland South American
Violence, 34 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 29-34 (2013) (analyzing violence in South
American societies and finding that attacks become deadlier when revenge is involved, and that
revenge raids become deadlier than the previous grievance, leading to cycles of violence).
315
See Lickel et al., supra note 283 (providing a theoretical framework for the phenomenon
of collective blame in which someone is attacked by virtue of their apparent shared identity
with the original perpetrator).
316
See Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Transnational Dimensions of Civil War, 44 J. PEACE RES.
293, 304 (2007) (finding “that countries recently involved in conflict or new states are
substantially more likely to experience conflict”).
317
Sabine C. Carey & Neil J. Mitchell, Progovernment Militias, 20 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 127,
139 (2017).
318
Id. at 132.
319
See Sandra Ley, To Vote or Not to Vote: How Criminal Violence Shapes Electoral
Participation, 62 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1963, 1963-64 (2018) (discussing studies that show
victims of political violence are more likely than nonvictims to participate in politics).
320
See Cynthia Akwei, Mitigating Election Violence and Intimidation: A Political
Stakeholder Engagement Approach, 46 POL. & POL’Y. 472, 491–92 (2018) (noting that these
incidents were not just the conference attendees creating negative feelings on their own, but
that the political candidates helping to incite bad feelings were not ruling governments and
still part of the “top-down” process).
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however, when it is “top-down” or sponsored by ruling governments who
attempt to suppress oppositional groups, reduce political competition, and
diminish voter turnout, thereby maintaining or even extending their political
power.321 Although such top-down election violence often entails a victory for
incumbents, their victory is usually temporary, as cycles of violence often follow
with, for example, oppositional forces resorting to violence to discredit the
government or incumbents further restricting peoples’ rights.
To illustrate, a study by Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski
examined 458 elections from 1981 to 2004, finding that election violence
increases the likelihood that incumbents remain in power, but also finding
that their society is at a greater risk for longterm cycles of violence.322 Postelection violence is often greater in magnitude than the initial pre-election
violence;323 leading to enduring struggles over land resources, ethicized party
formation, reduced voter turnout, declines in democracy and perceptions of
insecurity;324 and even to journalistic self-censorship.325 Given the social
volatility of elections, if a speaker incites violence during or soon after an
election period, his or her words are likely to be effective.
3. There is significant polarization of political organizations along
religious, ethnic, or racial lines.
Political polarization within a community or between communities is
known to increase intolerance and violence.326 When schisms occur along
religious,327 ethnic,328 or racial lines,329 communities can experience even
321

Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Susan D. Hyde & Ryan S. Jablonski, When Do Governments
Resort to Election Violence?, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 149, 150 (2013).
322
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Susan D. Hyde, & Ryan S. Jablonski, Surviving Elections:
Election Violence, Incumbent Victory and Post-Election Repercussions, 48 BRIT. J. POL. SCI.
459, 467, 482 (2018).
323
See, e.g., Henrik Angerbrandt, Deadly Elections: Post-Election Violence in Nigeria, 56 J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 143, 144 (2018) (describing how violence in reaction to election results,
such as those in Nigeria in 2011, can be of a much greater magnitude).
324
Id. at 144-45.
325
See Lisa Weighton & Patrick McCurdy, The Ghost in the News Room: The Legacy of
Kenya’s 2007 Post-Election Violence and the Constraints on Journalists Covering Kenya’s
2013 General Election, 11 J.E. AFR. STUD. 649, 662 (2017).
326
Debra H. Swanson, “All We Are Saying is Give Peace a Chance”: A Sociological
Response to Violence and Political Polarization, 50 SOC. FOCUS 291, 298 (2017).
327
See generally Dov Waxman, A Dangerous Divide: The Deterioration of JewishPalestinian Relations in Israel, 66 MIDDLE E.J. 11 (2012).
328
See generally DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985).
329
See generally Reeve D. Vanneman & Thomas F. Pettigrew, Race and Relative
Deprivation in the Urban United States, 13 RACE 461 (1972).

Vol. 5:2]

Incitement in an Era of Populism

113

greater escalations in violence, largely due to growing levels of mutual
mistrust, fear, and hostility. Political polarization along these lines, in turn,
can increase narratives of exclusive or competitive victimhood—i.e., “my
group has suffered more than anyone else’s”—and is linked to aggressive
policies toward an outgroup.330 As a result, polarization in the social and
historical context of a community makes it more likely that an audience will
be receptive to speakers who incite hatred or violence.331
Polarized communities are thus vulnerable to calls for seemingly
justified collective violence. Inciting authority figures and politicians, for
instance, often seek to amplify collective grievances and biases towards an
outgroup, whose members are generally portrayed as being responsible to
some degree for the ingroup’s travails.332 Communities are more sensitive to
scapegoating an outgroup during periods of acute loss, displacement, or
injustice in addition to heightened intergroup tensions over collective
memories of social trauma or unresolved political injustices. For example, a
famous study by Hovland showed that antiblack violence (including
lynching) in the southern United States between 1882 and 1930 significantly
and robustly correlated with poor economic conditions of perpetrator
communities.333 Exploiting grievances, then, in a politically polarized
environment along religious, ethnic or racial lines can easily stir up
animosities toward an outgroup.
4. The emotional state of the audience at the time of the speech
appears heightened and predisposed towards violent activity.
While outgroup aggression is often prompted by cognitive beliefs that
one’s ingroup is threatened by a targeted outgroup, it is usually emotionally
expressed as righteous indignation, such that the ingroup feels justified in
“self-defense” against the outgroup.334 Remarkably, political ideologies that
cultivate feelings of anger render groups more likely than others to
330

Luca Andrighetto, Silvia Mari, Chiara Volpato & Burim Behluli, Reducing Competitive
Victimhood in Kosovo: The Role of Extended Contact and Common Ingroup Identity, 33
POL. PSYCHOL. 513, 513-14 (2012).
331
Leader Maynard & Benesch, supra note 252, at 78.
332
See Herbert Blumer, Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position, 1 PAC. SOCIOL. REV.
3, 6 (1958) (discussing the major influence authorities, social elites, and public figures have
in shaping public discussions about group position and prejudice).
333
See generally Carl Iver Hovland & Robert R. Sears, Minor Studies of Aggression: VI.
Correlation of Lynchings with Economic Indices, 9 J. PSYCHOL 301 (1940) (discussing the
correlation between experienced economic deprivation in communities of white perpetrators
and mass violence against African Americans).
334
George, supra note 288, at 158-59.
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experience righteous indignation, thus suggesting the important role of a
speaker in cultivating anger prior to the onset of a threat.335 Testing this
hypothesis, Kuppens and colleagues undertook two studies in which groups
were induced with anger, finding that anger indeed caused a spike in
intergroup biases and hostilities—but only for outgroups that were portrayed
as threatening.336 Hence, anger seems to indicate that some persons are more
susceptible than others to channeling their frustrations into righteous
indignation and possibly violent actions toward a threatening outgroup.
D. Applying the Matrix: Sines v. Kessler
This Section illustrates how the matrix for conducting a risk analysis
of inciting speech can be applied to a concrete and recent case involving
incitement to violence presently being adjudicated in the courts, in order to
evaluate whether the framework could have predicted the eventual outcome.
The case is Elizabeth Sines v. Jason Kessler, a civil suit filed against the
organizers of a white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia on August
11–12, 2017. The facts of the case are provided in the memorandum opinion
issued on July 9, 2018 by District Judge Norman K. Moon allowing the suit to
proceed, in which the court took all factual allegations in the complaint as true.337
The central questions considered here are, could law enforcement
agencies have anticipated that the organizers’ direct advocacy of violence on
social media would lead to imminent lawless action, specifically to the injury
of dozens of protestors and the death of one protestor, Heather Heyer? Could
a systematic risk analysis conducted a priori have justified earlier
intervention by the authorities, and therefore prevented the harms and
fatality from occurring?
Each of the ten factors in the matrix are reviewed in the light of the
available evidence, to determine whether they were present before the white
nationalists’ torchlit march on the evening of August 11, 2017. The evidence
comes primarily from exchanges on social media and includes speech (for
instance, dehumanizing language) that may in itself be protected under the
First Amendment.

335
See Roni Porat, Eran Halperin & Maya Tamir, What We Want Is What We Get: GroupBased Emotional Preferences and Conflict Resolution, 110 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 167, 168-69 (2016).
336
Toon Kuppens, Thomas V. Pollet, Cátia Teixeira, Stéphanie Demoulin, S. Craig Roberts
& Anthony C. Little, Emotions in Context: Anger Causes Ethnic Bias but Not Gender Bias
in Men but Not Women, 42 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 432, 439-40 (2012).
337
Sines v. Kessler, 324 F.Supp.3d 765, 774 (W.D. Va. 2018).
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1. The speaker occupies an official position of authority within
government or a political party or political movement.
Present: The organizers of the march are leaders in the white
nationalist or white supremacist or neo-Nazi movement, holding official
positions of authority within their respective organizations. Defendants
include the leader of the Traditionalist Worker Party,338 the two leaders of the
League of the South,339leaders of the Nationalist Front, and the leader and
“Commander” of the National Socialist Movement, a white supremacist
organization with a paramilitary structure.340
2. The speaker is perceived by supporters as credible or charismatic.
Present: Defendant Richard Spencer has arguably the highest public
profile of any white supremacist in America.341 Spencer is a new breed of
media-friendly white supremacist, holding degrees from the Universities of
Virginia and Chicago, and attired in expensive three-piece suits, gold
cufflinks, and Swiss watches.342 He has single-handedly redefined white
supremacist politics in the current era, and coined the euphemistic expression
“alt-right.”343 He holds unparalleled sway in the white nationalist movement,
illustrated by his ability to bring together at Charlottesville a number of
disparate and sometimes antagonistic white nationalist groups. Spencer has a
devoted following who see him as a fearless and charismatic leader who they
venerate with chants of “Hail Spencer! Hail victory!”344 Defendant National
Socialist Movement leader Jeff Shoep also commands the devotion of his
followers, as expressed in online statements such as, “So much respect for
my Commander Jeff Schoep. I will go into battle with you anytime Sir.”345
3. The speaker has regular access to means of mass communication,
or the ability to control information, or to suppress alternative
sources of information.
338

Id. at 775.
Id. at 775-76.
340
Id. at 776, 793.
341
John Woodrow Cox, ‘Let’s Party Like It’s 1933’: Inside the Alt-Right World of Richard
Spencer, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/lets-partylike-its-1933-inside-the-disturbing-alt-right-world-of-richard-spencer/2016/11/22/cf81dc74
-aff-11e6-840f-e3ebab6bcdd3_story.html [https://perma.cc/8JDU-2XQV].
342
Id.
343
Id.
344
Sines v. Kessler, 324 F. Supp. 3d 765, 786 (W.D. Va. 2018)
345
Id. at 793-94.
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Present: Several defendants manage prominent websites or podcasts
that reach a wide audience of white nationalists. Defendants Andrew Anglin
and Robert Ray run the Daily Stormer website, and defendant Michael
Peinovich hosts a podcast called the Daily Shoah.346 Defendants Kessler and
Mosely coordinated the white nationalist march via a moderated social media
platform called “Discord” that is widely used by white nationalists.347 Much
of what the Court knows about the defendants’ conversations preceding the
white nationalist rally comes from a record of the exchanges on Discord.348
The Daily Stormer maintained a live feed of the events in Charlottesville,
where viewers made comments such as “We have an army! This is the
beginning of a war!”349 The fact pattern indicates that the organizers had more
than just a few social media accounts; they were publishers of content on
America’s leading white nationalist sites and had the ability to control
information conveyed to their mass audience.350
4. The message contains explicit or implicit calls for violent acts
against members of an outgroup.
Present: The conversation on Discord included planning details, racist
“jokes,” and both explicit and implicit calls for violence against counterprotestors. With respect to coded speech, we identified fake advertisements for
a pepper spray that would kill African Americans “on contact”351 and
questions about whether it was legal to run over protestors blocking a
roadway.352 In response, one Discord user posted a picture of a bus running
over protestors.353
Other statements on social media explicitly called for or
countenanced violence, such as “I’m ready to crack skulls,”354 references to
marchers as “warriors,”355 and exhortations to bring weapons and to wear “a
good fighting uniform.”356 Instructional videos posted on Discord showed
how to fight in military formation and use shields.357 Members of Vanguard
346

Id. at 775.
Id. at 776.
348
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Id. at 789.
350
Id. at 784-95.
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Id. at 777.
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Id. at 796.
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America discussed on social media which weapons they should bring,
including firearms, batons and knives.358 Sines concludes that such
statements went beyond mere advocacy of violence and included specific
instructions to carry out violent acts.359
Additionally, and more seriously, images of extreme violence and
animus circulated on Discord in the run-up to the march, including a drawing
of one defendant, Matthew Heimbach, with “kill tallies” of communists, the
words “n- killer,” and an image of decapitated black men.360 The phrase “run
them over” was popularized by websites such as the Daily Caller, on the
mass-circulation service Fox Nation, and by the defendants on Discord.361
5. The message dehumanizes an outgroup, expresses disgust for an
outgroup, or calls for acts of revenge against an outgroup.
Present: Posts on Discord used dehumanizing language to express
extreme racial animus against African American and Jewish individuals,362
with one Defendant telling a reporter that white nationalists “outnumbered
the anti-white, anti-American filth.”363 Another Defendant called the counterprotestors “savages.”364 Revenge speech was also present, although it came
after the events and therefore does not contribute to the risk analysis.
Defendant Kessler remarked on the intentional killing of protestor Heather
Heyer, agreeing with the Loyal White Knights that she was a communist and
adding that, “Communists have killed 94 million. Looks like it was payback
time.”365 Another defendant stated after Heyer was killed, “[O]ur rivals are
just a bunch of stupid animals.”366
6. The message identifies a direct threat to the ingroup and identifies
a clear and foreseeably violent course of action that can be taken
by listeners imminently to remove the source of the threat.
Present: White nationalist and supremacist groups have consistently
portrayed white Christians as under threat of replacement by Jews.367
358
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Defendant Eli Mosley of the Identity Evropa white supremacist organization
led the marchers in the chant “Jews will not replace us.”368 Mosley declared
that the defendants would not be replaced “without a fight.”369 Therefore,
organizers of the march identified Jews as a threat to their livelihoods, and
encouraged their followers to engage in a torchlit march in which they would
fight, literally and figuratively, to remove the threat.
7. There is a history of intergroup conflict between the ingroup and
outgroup, and the number of instances of intergroup violence has
increased overall in the previous twelve months.
Present: As seen in the introduction to this Article, after a decade of
decline, documented hate crimes increased sharply in 2016 and 2017,
indicating a general climate of heightened conflict between white nationalists
(ingroup) and nonwhites (outgroup) in the United States.370 If we focus more
specifically on the actions of white nationalist organizations, earlier in 2017,
white nationalist groups clashed with protestors in Berkeley, California over
the course of several months.371 A number defendants at Charlottesville
participated in the Berkeley skirmishes and one of them, Identity Evropa founder
Nathan Damigo, referred to Berkeley as a “test run” for Charlottesville.372
8. There is a major national political election in the next twelve
months or there was a major national political election in the last
twelve months.
Present: One of the most contentious national elections in the country’s
history took place only nine months prior to the August 2017 conflict. Defendant
Matthew Heimbach, secretary of the white supremacist Traditionalist Workers’
Party and an organizer of the Charlottesville march, maintained an active and
violent presence at Trump presidential election rallies and pled guilty to
disorderly conduct after assaulting protestors at a Trump rally in Louisville,
Kentucky in 2016.373
368
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See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
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Natasha Lennard, The Violent Clashes in Berkeley Weren’t ‘Pro-Trump’ Versus ‘AntiTrump’, ESQUIRE (April 16, 2017), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a54564/theviolent-clashes-in-berkeley-werent-pro-trump-versus-anti-trump/ [https://perma.cc/EC7H MMAA].
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Sines, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 790.
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Thomas Novelly & Matthew Glowicki, White Nationalist Pleads Guilty to Disorderly
Conduct at Trump Rally, COURIER J. (Louisville) (July 19, 2017), https://www.courierjournal.com/story/news/crime/2017/07/19/white-nationalist-pleads-guilty-harassment-chargetrump-rally/492219001/ [https://perma.cc/TB4B-X6UP].
369

Vol. 5:2]

Incitement in an Era of Populism

119

9. There is significant polarization of political organizations along
religious, ethnic, or racial lines.
Present: White nationalist and white supremacist organizations are by
definition polarized along ethnic, racial or religious lines, according to the
ideology of these groups, which either seek white dominance or a white ethnonationalist state.374 Defendant National Socialist Movement openly espouses a
neo-Nazi ideology,375 and defendant Richard Spencer advocates a “peaceful
ethnic cleansing” that would remove all non-whites from American soil.376
10. The emotional state of the audience at the time of the message
appears heightened and predisposed towards violent activity.
Present: The chorus of approval of violence on social media before
the march had identifiable effects on the emotional state of the white
nationalist marchers. Defendant Cantwell said to a reporter before the march
that he was “trying to make [himself] more capable of violence.”377 When
asked by a reporter if he was armed, Cantwell produced two semi-automatic
rifles, three handguns, and a knife.378 The emotional state of white
nationalist marchers appears to have been heightened in the pre-march
planning phase, as they were instructed to enter Emancipation Park in
military formations, some carrying pre-made banners with statements such
as, “Gas the k---s, race war now!”379 They shouted antisemitic slogans as
they passed a synagogue.380 At the torchlit march on August 11, white
nationalists gave Nazi salutes, chanted “Blood and Soil,” and made monkey
sounds at the protestors.381

374
See Amanda Taub, ‘White Nationalism,’ Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/22/world/americas/white-nationalism-explained.html
[https://perma.cc/RS7Z-PUGA] (describing how white nationalists seek the dominance of
white people); White Nationalist, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/extremist-files/ideology/white-nationalist [https://perma.cc/BL7V-3BMK] (last visited Jan.
28, 2019) (reviewing the ideology of white nationalist groups in America).
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See Neo-Nazi, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremistfiles/ideology/neo-nazi [https://perma.cc/HX7L-BS89] (reviewing the ideology of the National
Socialist Movement).
376
Taub, supra note 373.
377
Sines, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 786.
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In summary, ten of the ten risk factors were present before the events
in Charlottesville on August 11 and 12, 2017, indicating that imminent
violence was highly likely. As we now know, the defendants’ speech and
other acts did culminate in actual violence. Dozens of assaults occurred on
August 11, and one protestor, Heather Heyer, was killed on August 12, when
defendant James Fields drove his car into a crowd of peaceful protestors.382
Sines maintains that the statements on Discord indicate the defendants were
involved in a conspiracy to commit racial violence383 and that the violence
was “reasonably foreseeable,” citing as evidence the inciting speech on
Discord and other white nationalist sites, the instructions to bring lethal
weapons, and the post hoc approval of James Fields’s killing of a protestor.384
CONCLUSION
Drawing on behavioral and humanistic research, this Article provides
an urgently needed framework to determine whether lawless action is
imminent and likely to result from inciting speech. This ten-factor matrix is
of course open to revision as our knowledge improves. Skeptics may ask,
“why should we rely on social science when it’s always developing and
changing and there never seems to be unqualified certainty?” The obvious
reply is that legal procedure and doctrine is always developing and changing
too, and may at times lack certainty, as our review of First Amendment law
demonstrates. Evidently, both law and social research are moving targets.
They transform as societal norms shift and as our knowledge improves. It
behooves courts to ensure that they are adequately informed, which
necessarily brings law and science into dialogue with each other.
Given that federal and state prosecutors exercise wide discretion in
charging defendants for incitement, a more transparent risk assessment
framework is not in itself sufficient to transform incitement law, although it
is a necessary component of any reform. Here, it should be noted that legal
change often occurs through strategic litigation brought by pressure groups.
First Amendment law applies equally to criminal prosecution and to civil
litigation, and in each setting, the question is the same: “is this speech
constitutionally protected?” Now we have a framework for approaching that
question in a way that relies less on hunches and heuristics than empirically
based findings in historical, social science, and behavioral research.
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APPENDIX: THE INCITEMENT MATRIX
1. The speaker occupies an official position of authority within
government or a political party or political movement.
2. The speaker is perceived by supporters as credible or charismatic.
3. The speaker has regular access to means of mass communication, or
the ability to control information, or to suppress alternative sources of
information.
4. The message contains explicit or implicit calls for violent acts against
members of an outgroup.
5. The message dehumanizes an outgroup, or expresses disgust for an
outgroup, or calls for acts of revenge against an outgroup.
6. The message identifies a direct threat to the ingroup and identifies a
clear and foreseeably violent course of action that can be taken by
listeners imminently to remove the source of the threat.
7. There is a history of intergroup conflict between the ingroup and
outgroup, and the number of instances of intergroup violence has
increased overall in the previous twelve months.
8. There is a major national political election in the next twelve months or
there was a major national political election in the last twelve months.
9. There is significant polarization of political parties along religious,
ethnic, or racial lines.
10. The emotional state of the audience at the time of the message appears
heightened and predisposed towards violent activity.

